Assessing the benefits of price stability : the international experience by Andrés Domingo, Javier Angel et al.
Banco de España - Servicio de Estudios
Estudios Económicos, nº 69 - 1999
A S S E S S I N G
THE BENEFITS
OF PRICE STA B I L I T Y:
THE INTERNAT I O N A L
E X P E R I E N C E
Javier Andrés, Ignacio Hernando
and J. David López-Salido
Banco de España - Servicio de Estudios
Estudios Económicos, nº 69 - 1999
A S S E S S I N G
THE BENEFITS
OF PRICE STA B I L I T Y:
THE INTERNAT I O N A L
E X P E R I E N C E
Javier Andrés, Ignacio Hernando
and J. David López-Salido
In publishing this series the Banco de España seeks to disseminate
studies of interest that will help acquaint readers better
with the Spanish economy.
The analyses, opinions and findings of these papers represent
the views of their authors; they are not necessarily those
of the Banco de España.
ISSN: 0213-2699
ISBN: 84-7793-717-6
Depósito legal: M. 36523-2000
Imprenta del Banco de España
The Banco de España disseminates its main reports and most
of its publications via the INTERNET at the following website:
http://www.bde.es
INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. THE COSTS OF INFLATION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE.
I.1. Theoretical considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I.2. International evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I.2.1. Model-based estimates of the welfare costs of
inflation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I.2.2. Econometric estimates of the overall impact of
inflation on economic activity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I.3. Inflation and growth in the OECD: Descriptive statis-
tics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. THE COSTS OF INFLATION IN CONVERGENCE EQUA-
TIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II.1. Theoretical framework: The effect of inflation in con-
vergence equations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II.2. Estimation of the effect of inflation: main results. . . . .
II.3. Country-specific effects and the cost of inflation. . . . .
II.4. Causality analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II.5. The role of the financial system in the growth-inflation
link. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II.5.1. Theoretical and empirical backgrounds. . . . . .
II.5.2. Indicators of financial development. . . . . . . . . .
II.5.3. Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II.6. Concluding remarks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. THE DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF PERMANENT DISINFLA-
TIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III.1. The analysis of the long-run effects of disinflations: a
SVAR approach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5
9
13
13
18
18
19
26
35
36
39
43
50
57
59
61
66
70
73
74
Páginas
C O N T E N T S
III.2. Inflation, output and unemployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III.2.1. The model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III.2.2. Alternative Identifying restrictions. . . . . . . . . .
III.3. The disinflation in Spain: 1976-1996. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III.4. International Evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III.5. Concluding remarks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendix III.1.Econometric setup. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6
76
76
79
81
85
90
92
105
107
Páginas
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We owe special thanks to José Viñals for his constant encourage-
ment to write this book. He and Javier Vallés have closely followed the
different steps leading to the completion of this book, and have read the
manuscript providing numerous insightful comments and suggestions.
Several parts of the book have been presented at different meetings and
seminars including BIS, EEA Berlin, NBER Conference on Price Stability,
FEDEA, Simposio de Análisis Económico, Barcelona, Bank of Finland.
We express our gratitude to the participants in those meetings. Special
thanks go to members of the Banco de España Research Department,
for numerous comments in different seminar sessions. In particular, Luis
J. Álvarez, Sean Craig, Ángel Estrada, Jorge Martínez Pagés, Frederick
Mishkin, Fernando Restoy, and Teresa Sastre acted as discussants of
different sections providing comments that helped us to clarify some of
the technical issues addressed in the book. Paco de Castro provided su-
perb assistance with the data. Rafael Doménech made available to us
some of the data used in the book and he was always ready to give ad-
vice on the construction of the variables. The views in this book are sole-
ly responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting
the views of the Banco de España.
7
INTRODUCTION
The dynamic interaction between inflation and output has always been
a matter of concern for central bankers and for macroeconomists at large.
While the proximate causes of inflation are well known, its effects both in
the short run and over the medium term are less so. The failure of the in-
ternational monetary system and a series of supply shocks are at the root
of the upsurge of inflation during the seventies. The initial reaction of
monetary policies to these events was aimed at preventing the most neg-
ative consequences of the recession, and must share the blame for the
increased price instability. Since the mid eighties, things have changed
and price stability has become the main goal of monetary policies. That
this change of strategy has been successful in the inflation front nobody
can deny. What is less widely accepted is that this new environment of
low inflation has also contributed to bring about the high growth rates that
we witness today in most industrialised countries.
Admittedly, the link between stable prices and future growth is blurred.
Most of the theoretical analysis of the trade-off among inflation and
growth takes on a short-run perspective, whereas growth models have
been more concerned with the role of factors such as investment, school-
ing or innovation. However, it is also true that price stability as a policy
objective can only be justified on the basis of the welfare or output costs
of high inflation.
A great deal of research effort has been devoted in recent years to
assess these costs. Many of these studies have come up with a similar
conclusion: the costs of inflation are small but non-negligible. This is also
the main theme of this book, but our approach has several features that
depart somewhat from other published work. For one thing, we focus on
a sample of industrialised economies: the OECD. This is partly justified
on the basis of homogeneous data availability, but the main reason to do
that is that we are interested in testing whether or not inflation is costly
even at moderate rates, as the ones that characterise the OECD coun-
tries during the sample period (1960-1996). Most economists would
agree on the harmful effect of very high inflation rates, which simply de-
9
stroy the environment in which productive activities take place. However,
it is not that clear why production and trade can be so significantly dam-
aged by inflation rates around, say, 5-10%. Also working with a sample
of few countries makes it possible to control for some variables that may
bias the estimated long run correlation among inflation and income.
The focus on how to solve the issue of causality among inflation and
output is the second specific feature of our work. Gathering evidence on
the correlation among inflation and output at different time horizons is not
enough to draw monetary policy conclusions. Before that, it must be es-
tablished that causality is running from the former to the latter, i.e. that it
is current inflation what is lowering the prospects of future growth of an
economy. To do that, we follow several avenues. Standard instrumental
variable methods and causality tests give a strong hint about that it is in-
deed inflation what causes lower growth, rather than the other way round.
A more detailed analysis of this issue is pursued also by means of Struc-
tural Vector Autorregresion models (SVAR). This approach turns out to
be very adequate for the purpose at hand and uncovers a significant
long-run negative effect of nominal shocks on output. This is the effect
that might be behind the estimated negative correlation and is the one
that generates a long-run cost of inadequate monetary policies.
The rest of the book is organised as follows. Chapter 1 discussed the
main theoretical issues regarding the correlation between inflation and
growth and presents some descriptive statistics of the macroeconomic
performance of the OECD economies during the sample period. Chapter
2 provides an estimation of the long-run effect of inflation on growth with-
in the framework of convergence equations. The main advantage of
these equations are that they can be derived from a theoretical model of
economic growth and that allow for a clear distinction between level and
rate of growth effects of inflation. Chapter 3 presents a joint analysis of
both the short and long-run real effects of the disinflation processes in
some major OECD countries using a SVAR analysis. We seek to identify
the innovations behind the joint dynamics of output and inflation to see
what is the permanent effect of nominal shocks on them. The model here
is enlarged with the unemployment rate and the approach is mostly em-
pirical, although the restrictions invoked to identify alternative sources of
fluctuations can be justified on the basis of a fairly general macroeconom-
ic model.
All the evidence presented in this book points in the same direction:
even low or moderate inflation rates have a negative temporary impact
upon current or future growth rates; this effect is significant and gener-
ates a permanent reduction in the level of per capita income. The esti-
mated benefit of a permanent reduction in the inflation rate by a percent-
age point is an increase in the steady-state level of per capita income
10
which ranges from 0.5% to 1%.The estimated correlation among current
inflation and future income is robust, in an econometric sense, to
changes in the information set as well as to a number of improvements in
the specification of econometric models. In particular, the joint dynamics
of these two variables suggests that such correlation is driven by a gen-
uine negative effect running from truly exogenous innovations to inflation
(i.e. innovations to the rate of money growth) to the long-run component
of output. The book concludes with a more detailed account of the main
results.
11
ITHE COSTS OF INFLATION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
I.1. Theoretical Considerations
Business cycle theory offers different explanations for the positive
correlation between short-run fluctuations in output and inflation, i.e. the
co-movements between the deviations of output and inflation from their
respective trends. These explanations differ at least in three respects.
The first relates to the theoretical explanation of this empirical regularity.
Also economists disagree on the persistence of the Phillips curve with a
negative slope beyond the very short term. Finally, there is the question of
to what extent the economic authorities can use this negative correlation
to reduce unemployment in recessions, even at the expense of higher in-
flation. In sum, the main discrepancy in this field is between those au-
thors who defend inflation as a necessary evil that accompanies expan-
sions and those who argue that higher or lower inflation has no real
effect(1).
However, inflation, even when fully anticipated, has effects that manifest
essentially in the long run and that affect the productive capacity and poten-
tial income of economies. The theoretical discussion and formalisation of
this relationship have been unnoticed by business cycle models, which do
not address either the main cause of the lasting effects of inflation or its in-
fluence on the accumulation of productive factors and on the efficiency with
which such factors are applied to producing goods and services. It is rather
economic growth theory which tackles these aspects yielding an unequivo-
cal verdict on the harmful effect of inflation in the long run.
One notable exception is given by multiple equilibria and hysteresis
models. Under this approach, there is not a unique equilibrium in the
13
(1) At least when it is fully anticipated by economic agents.
economy but many levels of activity that may be considered as such in
the sense that the economy remains therein unless it undergoes some
exogenous shock. In these models, even a transitory shock (associated,
for example, with a temporary slowdown in the rate of money growth) can
shift the economy from a low unemployment equilibrium to one of high
unemployment, around which it stabilises. The existence of these diverse
equilibria is due to the presence of some type of strategic complementar-
ity or of increasing returns in production or trade technology [Mortensen
(1989)]. It is in these models that many authors find the essential expla-
nation for the high persistence of unemployment in many European coun-
tries [Blanchard and Summers (1987)], compared with what has hap-
pened in other developed economies. In accordance with this approach,
disinflation may have given rise to lasting effects on output and employ-
ment. Thus, a simplistic reading of these models would lead us to think of
a Phillips curve whose long-run slope was negative. This conclusion is,
however, hasty since it may not be inferred from these models that infla-
tion will necessarily have positive effects (2). A more qualified interpreta-
tion would be that the way in which disinflation processes are tackled is
not neutral in the medium run and that an erroneous inflation-control
strategy may contribute to exacerbating the costs of inflation (3).
The adverse effects of expected inflation on output have generally
been studied in growth models, both with constant returns and absence of
externalities [Orphanides and Solow (1990)] and in some endogenous
growth models [De Gregorio (1993)]. The structure of these models is rel-
atively simple. In them, per capita income growth is the outcome of the ac-
cumulation of productive factors and of the ongoing improvement in the ef-
ficiency with which such factors are used. Inflation may affect growth
through either channel, or through both at the same time. In fact, early at-
tempts to introduce money in growth models concluded that since money
and capital are rival assets in households’ portfolios, higher inflation, which
makes money holding less attractive, encourages capital accumulation re-
sulting in higher per capita income. This is the Mundell-Tobin effect.
However, this effect is not robust to the way money is introduced in
general equilibrium models. When money is taken to be a necessary de-
vice to carry out transactions (cash-in-advance constraint) or as a good
whose services yield some utility (money in the utility function), the effect
14
(2) In general, although the theoretical literature does not particularly stress the sub-
ject, it is not clear that the shift between differing equilibria is symmetrical. Although a tem-
porary decline in demand may lead an economy to a worse equilibrium situation, there is
not sufficient evidence in favour of a counter-movement in response to an expansionary pol-
icy.
(3) Specifically, hysteresis or persistence models infer that a gradualist disinflationary
strategy may, under certain conditions, be less costly than a more drastic strategy.
of anticipated inflation may be very different. As Walsh (1998) shows, ex-
cept for some particular set of preferences, the steady-state level of
labour supply, output and consumption, are not  independent of the
steady-state (fully anticipated) inflation rate, in many well defined
stochastic general equilibrium dynamic macroeconomic models. More of-
ten than not, money is non-superneutral, in these models but, unlike the
Mundell-Tobin effect, in this case higher inflation is associated with lower
levels of per capita income, consumption and utility.
These effects have been found to be empirically relevant [Bruno
(1993)]. In association with unexpected or volatile inflation, the effects of
uncertainty on investment returns are well known [Bruno (1993) and
Pindyck and Solimano (1993)]. Moreover, high inflation prompts uncer-
tainty over the future course of monetary policy, which exerts negative ef-
fects on domestic investment and on foreign capital inflows. But even
perfectly anticipated inflation reduces profitability because of the nominal
rigidity in the tax structure (e.g. tax allowances established in nominal
terms), whereby when inflation increases, the tax allowances in relative
terms diminish and the actual cost of investment increases [Jones and
Manuelli (1995), and Cohen, Hasset and Hubbard (1999)]. Feldstein
(1997, 1999) discusses alternative channels through which inflation can
have a substantial impact on economic welfare by increasing the tax-in-
duced distortions that would exist even with zero inflation. He concludes
that the effects arising from the interaction between the tax system and
inflation are sizeable (4).
Inflation also has a bearing on certain other determinants of long-term
growth. In particular, the accumulation of human capital may be harmed
by a prolonged period of inflation for reasons linked to the deterioration in
income distribution and tighter liquidity restrictions. For Galor and Zeira
(1994) the existence of an imperfect capital market tends to perpetuate
the differences in income distribution owing to the borrowing difficulties
faced by the poorest households to finance their education. If inflation
should adversely affect the distribution of income, the effects on potential
income may be significant [see, e.g. Alesina and Rodrik (1992)]. The dif-
ferential impact of inflation on different agents is harmful for creditors and
for recipients of non-indexed income, and may distort the allocation of re-
sources and effort. In this respect, the change in relative consumer and
leisure prices may distort the choice between income and leisure, shifting
labour supply away from its optimum level [De Gregorio, (1993)].
15
(4) In his own words, “the deadweight loss associated with inflation is therefore not the
traditional small triangle that would result from distorting a first-best equilibrium but is the
much larger trapezoid that results from increasing a large initial distortion” (Feldstein, 1999,
p. 10).
When inflation negatively affects some of the so-called engines of
growth, such as those mentioned above, this effect will only be detected in
empirical growth equations in the absence of such variables. Nonetheless,
most empirical models of economic growth already take into account the in-
fluence of these variables through the inclusion of the rate of accumulation
of physical capital, that of human capital, the growth rate of labour supply or
R+D spending, as additional regressors in the equations. The presence of
inflation, with a significant coefficient, in these models is indicative of an ef-
fect which goes beyond that of a reduction in the accumulation of productive
factors (accumulation effect) and which is associated with the impact of
macroeconomic instability on total factor productivity. Although this presence
may be due to poor specification owing to the omission of relevant variables,
there is no shortage of arguments to justify the relevance of this transmis-
sion channel (efficiency effect) for the negative effects of inflation.
Although there has been little theoretical formalisation of these ef-
fects, a set of arguments has been recurrently used in most papers that
have attempted to justify the harmful effect of inflation in the long run (5).
Among the costs arising from inflation are those associated with changes
in prices («menu costs») or with the increase in the number of transac-
tions needed to reduce average holdings of liquid balances («shoe-
leather costs»). Further, inflation distorts price signals [Smyth, (1994)], in-
ducing greater and more frequent prediction errors that hamper the opti-
mal allocation of resources. Inflation blurs the distinction between rises in
the general level of prices and changes in relative prices. Generally, the
increase in uncertainty about the future course of inflation and the difficul-
ty of identifying changes in relative prices act as incentives for economic
agents to assign more resources to protect themselves from inflation and
fewer resources to be efficient and competitive in the production of goods
and services [De Gregorio (1996)].
Inflation causes rises in interest rates that likewise become more
volatile as the risk premium increases. Uncertainty in turn jeopardises
the maintenance of the monetary authority’s credibility in terms of its
economic policy strategy. It should be borne in mind that the degree of
uncertainty about the future design and implementation of monetary
policy is related to the central bank’s level of independence. The recent
theoretical literature coincides in that central bank independence con-
tributes favourably to controlling inflation (6). The pursuit by economic
16
(5) As Briault (1995) indicates, it is very difficult to derive a direct effect of inflation on
factor productivity from general equilibrium models.
(6) The papers by Repullo (1993) or Fischer (1995) are cases in point. Consensus on
this point goes beyond academic circles and, in this respect, legal reforms have been enact-
ed since 1989 to endow the central banks in many countries with greater independence
(see Cukierman, 1996).
authorities of various objectives generates an inflationary bias [Barro
and Gordon (1983)]. One possible solution to this is to delegate respon-
sibility for monetary policy decisions to a central bank not subject to
government authority and with price stability as its primary goal [Rogoff
(1985), Persson and Tabellini (1993) and Walsh (1995)] (7). Inflation
that is high and out of control gives off a negative signal to financial
markets regarding the monetary authority’s degree of independence
and/or of commitment in fighting for nominal stability, which diminishes
its credibility and, by extension, the effectiveness of its actions. Last but
not least, inflation reduces the effectiveness with which the different
productive sectors operate, particularly the financial sector. This phe-
nomenon is especially harmful for economic growth, as King and Levine
(1993b) have recently argued (8). These authors also present convinc-
ing empirical evidence on the existence of positive causality running in
a direction from the level of development of the financial system (ap-
proximated by a series of aggregate indicators) to the economic growth
r a t e .
Finally, while the belief that the long-run costs of inflation are signifi-
cant is widely shared by most economists and policymakers for countries
with moderates or high average inflation rates, its validity for economies
with low inflation rates is a question that remains open. Some recent the-
oretical models predict that inflation has potential benefits as it “greases
the wheels” of the labour market as well as potential costs induced by its
disruption (“add sand to”) of wage and price adjustments. The grease ef-
fect arises from downward rigid wages in economies facing negative sup-
ply shocks. Inflation facilitates relative price adjustments reducing the ex-
tent to which nominal rigidities distort employment and output. The sand
effect arises from the existence of nominal rigidities (due to menu costs
or informational problems). Then, a pure nominal shock will change rela-
tive prices and wages, which misdirects resources and lowers output be-
low potential (9).
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(7) Notwithstanding the virtual unanimity with respect to the favourable effect of the
monetary authority’s independence on inflation, contradictory positions are held as regards
the effect on the volatility of output (Pollard, 1993, Debelle and Fischer, 1995 and Alesina
and Gatti, 1995).
(8) Certain authors (Pagano, 1993 and Japelli and Pagano, 1994) have pointed out
that the liquidity restrictions associated with a relatively undeveloped financial system and
with unequal income distribution may encourage saving. Although a more uncertain environ-
ment may possibly be conducive to precautionary saving, it is not clear whether the uncer-
tainty associated with a relatively undeveloped financial system eases the channelling of
these funds towards increased investment.
(9) See Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996) and Groshen and Schweitzer (1999) for a
formalization of these arguments and for an estimation of the grease and sand effects in
the U.S. economy. See King (1999) for a skeptical view on the importance of nominal stick-
iness, in a low inflation environment, as an argument to abandon the pursuit of price stabil-
i t y .
I.2. International Evidence
The empirical literature on the costs of inflation is extensive and it in-
cludes studies covering a wide variety of methodologies (10). This empir-
ical work may be classified in two categories. A first strand of the empiri-
cal literature deals with the measurement of the welfare costs of inflation
arising from specific channels. This model-based empirical literature, us-
ing either a partial equilibrium or a general equilibrium approach, at-
tempts to provide a direct measure of some of the costs associated to in-
flation. On the other hand, some papers provide econometric estimates of
the impact of inflation on the level (or growth rate) of economic activity
(measured by output, productivity or per capita income). This approach,
that includes both cross-country and single country time-series analyses,
provides an overall assessment of inflation’s effect on economic activity
without making explicit the precise channels through which inflation oper-
ates. 
I.2.1. Model-based estimates of the welfare costs of inflation 
The model-based empirical literature deals with some specific chan-
nels through which inflation reduces welfare. It has mainly focussed on
two types of costs associated to inflation: first, those arising from consider-
ing inflation as a tax on real balances (shoe-leather costs), and, second,
those resulting from the interaction of inflation and the tax system. Partial
equilibrium and general equilibrium models have been used to obtain es-
timates of both types of welfare costs. In short, these calculations make
use on previous empirical work on money demand equations or other de-
mand equations to compute deadweight loss areas. These partial equilib-
rium studies attempt to measure how these areas change in response to
inflation changes or, in other words, how inflation exacerbates existing
distortions (11). Similarly, general equilibrium papers draw on previous
empirical literature modelling inflation distortions to obtain their key pa-
rameters. The models are calibrated –to take into account the salient
features of the tax system and other characteristics of the economy– a d
18
(10) Briault (1995), Black et al. (1998), O’Reilly (1998) and Viñals(1998) survey the lit-
erature on the benefits of price stability.
(11) Howitt (1990) provides an example of this type of approach to estimate the shoe-
leather costs of inflation. Similarly, a set of recent papers –Feld tein (1999), Bakhsi,  Hal-
dane and Hatch (1999), Dolado, González-Páramo and Viñals (1999) and Tödter and
Ziebarth (1999)– estimates the deadweight losses that result from the interaction of inflation
and the tax system in four countries: United States, United Kingdom, Spain and Germany.
These studies, developed within the framework of the NBER project on “The Costs and
Benefits of Achieving Price Stability”, show how differences in national tax systems imply
differences in the costs of disinflation.
simulated to provide comparisons –in terms of welfare or steady-state
output– under different inflation assumptions (12).
I.2.2. Econometric estimates of the overall impact of inflation on
economic activity
Table I.1 draws together the most significant characteristics of some
of the papers addressing the measurement of the overall long-run effect
of inflation. Panel A of Table I.1 presents studies using time-series data
and methods for a particular country or group of countries, whereas Pan-
el B presents some of the cross-country analyses that explicitly take into
account the cross-country dimension of the data.
Single-country evidence from time-series analysis
A first look at the empirical evidence based on single-country time-se-
ries analysis shows a lack of consensus regarding the sign and size of
the long-run relationship between inflation and growth. Grimes (1991)
considers a simple specification in which the growth rate of output is ex-
plained by various indicators of the inflation rate for the OECD countries.
The results point towards a negative association for most of the coun-
tries, although this correlation is not robust to changes in the estimation
method. Likewise, Smyth (1994) obtains a negative effect of inflation and
its first difference on the growth of US private-sector output. However,
Stanners (1993) for a sample of 9 industrialised countries does not find
any significant correlation between inflation and output growth.
Rudebusch and Wilcox (1994) use time series from single countries
(G-7) to estimate the influence of inflation on productivity growth. They
observe a negative relationship between these two variables. In addition,
they find that inflation Granger-causes productivity growth. However,
these results are only significant for Canada, United Kingdom and United
States. And, in general, the significance of the estimated relationship de-
pends, to a large extent, on the statistical method used to disentangle the
cyclical and long-run relationship between inflation and productivity
growth. Similar results are found in Sbordone and Kuttner (1994) for the
U.S. economy. These authors find that inflation Granger-causes produc-
tivity growth, but this result is not robust to the inclusion of additional vari-
19
(12) Lucas (2000) surveys recent research on the welfare costs of inflation and pro-
vides new estimates based on US data. See also O’Reilly (1998) for an overview of gener-
al-equilibrium estimates of the costs of inflation.
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ables. Using a bivariate time series model, they also show that the size
and sign of the estimated effect on productivity of a permanent shock to
inflation depends on the identifying scheme used to distinguish inflation
shocks from productivity shocks. Finally, Bullard and Keating (1995), us-
ing a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) approach for fifty-eight
countries, do not find a systematic long-run relationship between inflation
and the level of output (13). Nevertheless, their results are heavily depen-
dent on the way nominal shocks are identified. As we will see in chapter
3, alternative identification schemes lead to a remarkably different pattern
of results.
The ambiguity of the results of the single-country approaches is far
from surprising given the serious limitations that face most of these stud-
ies when trying to capture the long-run impact of inflation on economic
activity. First, as predicted by business cycle theory, there is a positive
short-run relationship between inflation and growth, with the direction of
causality going from growth to inflation, that may bias the estimation of
the long-run effect of inflation on growth. Second, it is difficult to disentan-
gle the genuine effect of inflation from the effect that is induced by the re-
sponse of economic policy; for instance, high inflation may provoke a
monetary tightening which in turn will reduce output growth. Finally, the
observed negative correlation between inflation and output growth might
be driven by the presence of supply shocks. In fact, excluding the years
immediately after the oil shocks of 1972-73 and 1979, reduces the signifi-
cance of the results [see, for instance, Rudebusch and Wilcox (1994)].
Cross-country evidence
The use of cross-country data helps to avoid some, though certainly
not all, of the problems associated to single-country time series analyses.
By averaging the data for each country over a number of years it is possi-
ble to get rid of the problems that are associated with the use of high fre-
quency data, namely the short-run correlation between inflation and
growth, arising from business cycle or policy reaction considerations. This
is the main reason behind the extensive use of cross-section databases
in the burgeoning empirical literature estimating the overall long-run im-
pact of inflation on economic activity.
Thus, Kormendi and Meguire (1985) estimate a growth equation with
cross-section data in which the effect of the initial income is controlled
along with a series of macroeconomic indicators, including inflation. The
23
(13) See Bullard (1999) for a survey on this sort of time series evidence.
effect of this variable on the growth rate is negative, but it loses explana-
tory power when other regressors are included, in particular the rate of in-
vestment. That would denote that the effect of inflation mainly shows it-
self by reducing investment but not total factor productivity. Grier and Tul-
lock (1989) estimate a model that excludes the investment rate and in-
cludes various measures of nominal instability (inflation rate, price accel-
eration and standard deviation of inflation). The results differ across
country groupings, but for the OECD sample the variability of inflation ap-
pears to have a significant and adverse effect on growth.
Further to these seminal papers, the study of the long-term influence
of inflation has been mainly undertaken within the framework of conver-
gence equations derived from economic growth theory (14). Some excep-
tions, however, are the papers by Cardoso and Fishlow (1989), Burdekin,
Goodwin, Salamun and Willett (1994) and Bruno (1993). Cardoso and
Fishlow (1989), using a panel of five-year averages for 18 Latin-American
countries, encounter a negative impact of inflation on the growth rate of
per capita income, conditioned on high-inflation countries being included
in the sample. This same negative effect is found by Burdekin et al.
(1994), that also find it more significant in the case of the developed
countries. In a more complete study, Bruno (1993) identifies an associa-
tion between inflation and growth in the industrialised countries which,
however, has not remained unchanged during the period he looks at.
Bruno finds that the main channel of influence through which macroeco-
nomic shocks bear on long-term growth is their effect on the rate of capi-
tal accumulation, a finding that matches that obtained by Pindyck and
Solimano (1993) in the estimation of investment equations for a broad
group of countries.
Fischer (1991, 1993) detects a most sizeable influence exerted by
various short-term macroeconomic indicators on the growth rate, both
through an exercise of growth accounting and through the estimation of
convergence equations. Inflation (like other indicators of macroeconomic
instability) reduces both capital accumulation and total factor productivity.
Cozier and Selody (1992) estimate the effect of inflation on the level and
growth rate of output per worker by means of a cross-section regression
in which the observations are averages of the different variables between
1960 and 1985. The specification chosen is derived from the exogenous
growth model augmented with the level and variance of the inflation rate.
For the sub-sample of OECD countries, the effects of inflation are more
appreciable in the level than in the growth rate of productivity, while the
variability of inflation does not appear to have a significant effect. For a
broader sample, including less industrialised countries, the effects are
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(14) These equations are derived and their properties discussed in the following chapter.
more significant (and always negative), both in the short and the long run.
This result coincides with that obtained more recently by Barro (1995) in
a sample of over 100 countries. Barro found that inflation has a negative
albeit not very considerable effect on long-term growth while the effect of
inflation variability is not robust to alternative specifications. The adverse
impact of inflation is particularly unfavourable for relatively high levels of
inflation, denoting the presence of some non-linearity in the effect consid-
ered. The general conclusion of these and other studies [De Gregorio
(1992a, 1992b and 1996), Motley (1994)] is consistent with the negative
correlation between inflation and long-term income suggested by the the-
oretical literature.
Some authors have criticised these results owing to the lack of a suf-
ficiently developed theoretical framework in which to interpret them and,
in particular, to the lack of robustness to changes in the econometric
specification. This latter argument is developed in Clark (1997), who finds
that minor alterations in the sample period, whether in the group of coun-
tries or in the econometric specification, substantially alter the estimated
effect of inflation in the context of convergence equations. Levine and
Zervos (1993) and, in particular, Levine and Renelt (1992) further devel-
op this line of reasoning. These authors conduct an exhaustive sensitivity
analysis of the set of explanatory variables found in the literature on eco-
nomic growth. They show how most of these variables are not robust to
changes in the conditioning information set (15). This is true for the infla-
tion rate, but also for the rest of the variables approximating nominal sta-
bility in the economies of the sample. Nonetheless, these findings are not
free from criticism either. Sala-i-Martín (1994) argues that the difficulty of
finding a macroeconomic indicator whose effect is robust to alternative
specifications of the convergence equation should not be interpreted as
an absence of this influence but rather as the difficulty of finding indica-
tors that can adequately capture this effect for any period and group of
countries. Andrés, Doménech and Molinas (1996) show that, for the
OECD as a whole, the macroeconomic policy variables are even more ro-
bust than the accumulation rates in the explanation of economic growth.
Other authors argue that inflation only affects output insofar inflation
goes beyond some certain threshold; thus, it would be the inclusion of
high inflation countries in the sample what really drives the estimated cor-
relation. However, the evidence regarding this criticism is not conclusive.
First, the threshold below which the effects of inflation become insignifi-
cant differs across studies. This threshold is 8 % in Sarel (1996), 10 % in
Judson and Orphanides (1996), 15 % in Barro (1995) and 40 % in Bruno
and Easterly (1998). The picture may be even more complex. Ghosh and
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(15) McCandless and Weber (1995) conclude also that the cross-country correlation
between inflation and growth is zero.
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Phillips (1998) find a negative growth-inflation relationship with two non-
linearities: the negative effect is higher for lower inflation rates, but at very
low inflation rates (less than 2-3 percent) inflation and growth are positive-
ly related. Second, in the framework of cross-country convergence equa-
tions, a significant long-run cost of inflation is also found for samples in-
cluding more stable economies (for instance, OECD excluding high infla-
tion countries). Moreover, in this same framework, when non-linearities in
the effect of inflation are allowed the results suggest that, if anything, it
pays more in the case of a low inflation country than in a high-inflation one
to reduce the inflation rate by a given amount (16). Equivalently, it is more
costly for a low-inflation country to concede an additional (and permanent)
point of inflation than it is for a country with a higher starting rate.
Summing up, the whole endeavour of uncovering a causal relation-
ship among current inflation and future output (growth) has proved to be
a difficult one. A fair summary of this literature would conclude that cur-
rent high inflation is never associated with faster future growth, although
the existence of a negative correlation among these variables is still an
open issue. The most compelling criticisms on the estimated negative
correlation are related to the likely simultaneity bias that may arise since
both are endogenous variables in a macroeconomic system. As it has
been already mentioned, there are many authors that find that such cor-
relation is spurious and driven by some sort of mispecification in the em-
pirical models (endogeneity, fixed effects and omitted relevant variables)
or by the inclusion of high inflation countries in the sample. Even among
those who do not dispute that negative correlation as an empirical regu-
larity, there are some that do not give it a particular relevance for policy
purposes arguing that it is generated by reverse causality (running from
low growth to high inflation) caused by the predominance of supply
shocks during the sample period. In chapters 2 and 3 of this book, all this
criticisms are taken into account with the aim of answering, using alterna-
tive methodologies, two questions: first, is there a significant long-run cor-
relation among output and inflation?; second, is that correlation usable for
monetary policy purposes?, or do sound monetary policies aimed at
achieving low inflation have a bearing on the long run path of output in
advanced economies?.
I.3. Inflation and Growth in the OECD: Descriptive Statistics
Table I.2 draws together the key statistics on macroeconomic perfor-
mance in the OECD countries during the sample period, in terms of out-
( 1 6 ) See, for instance, Fischer (1993), Motley (1994), Gylfasson and Herbertsson
(1996) and Andrés and Hernando (1999).
put, output growth and inflation (17). On average, the OECD countries
have grown at an annual rate of 2.7 % over the past 36 years, with annu-
al per capita income rising to $21,600 in 1996. The differences in the rate
of growth are highly significant. The 12 countries with the lowest average
per capita income in the period 1961-1996 have grown 0.6 % more rapid-
ly (in annual average terms) than the richest countries. Setting aside the
extreme cases, most countries attained an annual growth rate of between
2 % and 3 % on average, except for the poorest countries, whose growth
rates have been higher than 3 % per annum. Despite a tendency for
these income disparities to narrow, they were still very substantial be-
tween countries in 1996 (18). For example, the per capita income of the
richest country was more than five times larger than that of the poorest
country.
Among the determinants of economic growth, the accumulation of
productive factors plays a decisive role. Thus, the sustained growth of the
OECD countries has been based on a high and relatively stable rate of
investment (22.2 % on average). In general, the countries with the higher
rates of investment are among those which have exhibited the highest
growth rates. Conversely, among the countries that have grown less are
some with very low rates of investment. Nonetheless, this preliminary
look at the data does not reveal a very clear pattern as far as the relation-
ship between the level of per capita income and the rate of investment is
concerned. Indeed, the rate of investment of the group of OECD coun-
tries with lower-than-average per capita income is not significantly differ-
ent from that observed for the group of the richest OECD countries.
A simple examination of the data does not offer much clarification ei-
ther of the sign of the effect of inflation on economic growth. Columns 4
and 5 of Table I.2 summarise the behaviour of two indicators of price
evolution for the set of countries considered: the average rate of inflation
of each country, for the entire sample period, and the variability of infla-
tion, measured by the coefficient of variation. Set against the relative unifor-
mity of the per capita GDP growth rates, a notable dispersion in inflation
rates is seen. The relationship between inflation and growth is not imme-
diate. Grouping the countries on the basis of the level of their average per
capita income over the period 1961-1996, the poorest countries have suf-
fered an average inflation rate almost four points higher than that in the
richest countries. However, from the standpoint of the rate of growth, the
evidence is more ambiguous. The 12 countries that have most grown
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(17) Unless stated otherwise, most of our data are taken from the OECD data base
elaborated by Dabán, Doménech and Molinas (1997).
(18) Some of the exercises in the book have been extended up to 1998 without signif-
icant changes in the results. Notwithstanding, to maintain a homogeneous sample period in
all three chapters we present the results obtained for this slightly shorter time span.  
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TABLE I.2
BASIC STATISTICS 1961-1996
European 2.8 21.1 21.7 7.0 0.63
Union G-7 2.8 23.3 23.3 5.7 0.85
OECD 2.7 21.6 22.2 8.5 0.72
High income 2.4 24.9 22.3 6.6 0.75
Low income 3.0 18.3 22.2 10.4 0.69
High growth 3.3 21.6 23.8 8.6 0.69
Low growth 2.1 21.5 20.7 8.3 0.75
High inflation 2.8 18.8 21.4 12.0 0.80
Low inflation 2.7 24.4 23.1 5.0 0.64
Growth rate of
real per capita
income
(a)
Real per
capita income
in 1996
(b)
Investment
(% of GDP)
(a)
Inflation
rate
(a)
Volatility
of
inflation
(c)
Source: OECD.
(a) Average 1961-1996.
(b) In thousands of 1993 US $.
(c) Coefficient of variation.
during the sample period do not exhibit an average inflation rate substan-
tially different from that of the OECD as a whole (8.6 % compared with
8.3 %). Consequently, the simple correlation analysis (Panel A of Fig-
ure I.1) shows a rather imprecise relationship between inflation and the
growth rate of per capita income. It must be borne in mind, however, that
this correlation does not consider other determinants of an economy’s
growth rate, which are incorporated into the subsequent econometric
analysis (in the other chapters of this book). Panel B of FigureI.1 shows
that controlling for the  effect of the initial income of each country in 1960,
the partial correlation between the inflation rate and the growth rate be-
comes unambiguously negative. Moreover, there does appear to be a
negative relationship between the inflation rate and the investment rate.
Specifically, the average of the investment rate for the countries with low-
er inflation is almost two percentage points higher than that of the high-in-
flation countries.
The characteristics reflected in Table I.2 show very long-term trends
that have not held stable throughout the period. In the period spanning
1960 to 1996, the OECD economies have experienced different periods
of expansion and recession, during which time the relationship between
the macroeconomic magnitudes may have changed. A more time-de-
tailed analysis may cast some additional light on the inflation/growth rela-
tionship. This can be seen splitting the sample to three periods of similar
length; these coincide with three clearly distinct phases: sustained growth
(1961-1972), recession (1973-1984) and disinflation (1985-1996). The
decline in growth rates since the mid-seventies is appreciable not only for
the OECD as a whole (see FigureI.2) but also for the different groups of
countries considered. The average rate is virtually halved (from 4.1 % to
2 %) between the first period considered and the other two and it is the
consequence of widely differing developments within the OECD. Taken
as a whole, the OECD countries have seen their investment rate gradual-
ly diminish (see FigureI.3). Thus, during the phase of sustained growth
(1961-1972), the average rate of investment stood at 23.6 %, falling to
22.3 % in the period of recession (1973-1984) and to 20.8 % in the period
of disinflation (1985-1993). Once again, this overall behaviour hides wide-
ly differing individual behaviour.
As can be seen in FiguresI.2 and I.4, cyclical developments in the
OECD economies react in a complex fashion to the behaviour of inflation.
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FIGURE I.1
PER CAPITA INCOME AND INFLATION GROWTH (1961-1996)
(a) Residuals from the regression of the inflation rate on initial per capita income.
(b) Residuals from the regression of the per capita income growth rate initial per capita income.
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FIGURE I.2
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PER CAPITA
INCOME GROWTH RATES (a)
(a) In percent per year. 288 observations in each panel.
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FIGURE I.3
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF INVESTMENT RATES (a)
(a) In percent per year. 288 observations in each panel.
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FIGURE I.4
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF INFLATION RATES (a)
(a) In percent per year. 288 observations in each panel.
Following an initial period in which nominal growth was equally distributed
between growth of prices (5.3 % in annual average terms) and output
(4.1 %), was one in which the inflation rate was almost sevenfold the real
growth rate (12.9 % compared with 2 %). It has not been possible in the
period 1985-1996 fully to restore the situation prior to 1973; during these
years, and despite the ongoing efforts to keep inflation under control, in-
flation has still been far higher than the average growth rate of per capita
output (7.3 % against 2 %). There are also significant differences across
countries in this case. The richest countries were better able initially to
control the inflation shock, and subsequently managed to restore pre-
1973 levels. Thus, the inflation rate for G7 or for the twelve richest OECD
countries has, in the 1985-1996 period, been even lower than that of the
pre-recession period. Conversely, the least advanced OECD countries
have, in recent years, exhibited an inflation rate almost twice as high as
the one which they achieved during the period 1960-1972.
Overall, OECD economies have attained considerable growth rates,
and pivotal in this connection has been the maintenance of high invest-
ment rates and the catching-up or convergence process. That said, the
description of the empirical evidence given in this section is only a partial
approximation to the analysis of the inflation/growth relationship, since we
do not consider other determinants of growth whose incorporation into
the study requires a regression analysis. Moreover, the combining of peri-
ods with differing macroeconomic results indicates that a mere cross-sec-
tion analysis of broad historical averages may be insufficient to study the
relationship between growth and inflation. Further, the evidence generally
indicates that the richest OECD countries have grown less than the
OECD-wide average, whereby the correlation between inflation and the
long-term level of per capita income differs perforce from the correlation
with the growth rate. This distinction points to the advisability of an analyt-
ical framework that allows an explicit distinction to be drawn between ef-
fects on the level and on the growth rate. All these issues are borne in
mind in the analysis addressed in the following chapters.
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II
THE COSTS OF INFLATION IN CONVERGENCE EQUATIONS
This chapter provides an estimation of the correlation among the in-
flation rate and some measure of the macroeconomic performance
across OECD countries, within the framework of the empirical analysis
based in standard models of economic growth. A series of recent papers
have tried to assess the overall long run impact of current inflation within
the framework of the so-called convergence equations. These equations
can be derived from a theoretical model of economic growth and have
several advantages for the purposes at hand. First, and foremost, an ex-
plicit model reduces the risk of omitting relevant variables. Second, con-
vergence equations allow for a variety of effects of inflation, including
those that reduce accumulation rates and those that undermine the effi-
ciency with which productive factors operate. Finally, in this framework a
clear distinction can be made between level and rate of growth effects of
inflation; this difference matters as regards the size and the timing of the
costs of inflation. This approach has some shortcomings too. First, the
precise channels through which inflation affects growth are not made ex-
plicit and alternative channels can only be disentangled in a very rough
manner. Also, growth models focus on long run issues, disregarding the
short run costs associated to disinflation (the sacrifice ratio). Third, con-
vergence equations rely heavily on the use of multi-country data sets to
prevent a shortage of degrees of freedom at the cost of imposing untest-
ed restrictions in the parameter set. Finally, the direction of causality
among the variables included in convergence equations is not unambigu-
ous. Causality is a crucial issue in this field and will be discussed at
length both in this chapter and in the next one.
The main results of the chapter can be summarised as follows. Even
low or moderate inflation rates (as the ones that characterise the recent
experience of most OECD countries) have a negative temporary impact
upon current or future growth rates; this effect is significant and gener-
ates a permanent reduction in the level of per capita income. Inflation not
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only reduces the level of investment but also the efficiency with which
productive factors are used. The estimated benefit of a permanent reduc-
tion in the inflation rate by a percentage point is an increase in the
steady-state level of per capita income which ranges from 0.5% to 1 %.
Although the size varies somewhat across specifications, the correlation
among inflation and future income is never found positive. This result
holds across different sub-samples (even excluding high-inflation coun-
tries) and is also robust to alternative econometric specifications, to the
inclusion of country-specific effects and to the presence of indicators of fi-
nancial development.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section II.1 describes
the model. In section II.2 we present the estimated convergence equa-
tions augmented with the rate of inflation, whereas in section II.3 the em-
pirical model is further augmented to allow for cross-country heterogene-
ity. In these two sections, we test the sensitivity of the results to the ex-
clusion of high-inflation countries. Moreover, in section II.3 we estimate
the long run benefits of a permanent disinflation and address the issue of
whether the cost of inflation varies with the level of inflation or not. In sec-
tion II.4 standard causality tests are applied to the inflation-growth rela-
tionship. In section II.5 we jointly estimate the effects of financial develop-
ment and inflation on growth, to ascertain whether the estimated negative
long-run effect of inflation on growth withstands the presence of banking
and stock market indicators. Section II.6 concludes with some additional
remarks.
II.1. Theoretical framework: The effect of inflation in convergence
equations
In many growth models, money is non superneutral, so that changes
in anticipated inflation reduces income. These models have proper mi-
croeconomic foundations and are easily interpretable. However, since
most of the modern work on the long run relationship between inflation
and income is cast in the framework of the convergence equations, we
follow this path to make our results comparable with those obtained in
other studies. Thus, in this section, the correlation between inflation and
growth is approached within the framework of the convergence equations
as proposed by Barro and Sala-i-Martín (1991), which represent the main
empirical proposition of growth models with constant returns(1). In doing
so, however, we do not intend to test any particular model of economic
growth since, as Gylfason and Herbertsson (1996) have pointed out,
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(1) De Gregorio (1993) and Roubini and Sala-i-Martín (1995) provide more elaborate
models of the interaction between inflation and growth.
these equations might encompass the empirical implications of different
(endogenous) growth models. The main advantage of this specification is
that it systematically captures most of the factors that have been usually
considered as determinants of growth, reducing the risk of omitting rele-
vant regressors entailed in ad hoc s p e c i f i c a t i o n s(2). The technology is
represented by the following production function of constant returns
[Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992)],
Yt = (At Lt)
b Kat H
g
t [II.1]
Total factor productivity (At) grows at the constant exogenous rate f,
whereas fixed capital (K) and human capital (H) grow in proportion to the
output assigned for their accumulation(3). Assuming that the deprecia-
tion rates of both factors are the same, it is possible to derive the follow-
ing equation of growth between two moments in time (T and T + t):
yT+t– yT =ft + (1 – e
–lt) [Vc + y*T – yT] [II.2]
where yt represents the logarithm of per capita income in the period indi-
cated by the subscript, and y*t represents its steady-state value. Expres-
sion [II.2] indicates that the growth rate of an economy will have a compo-
nent determined by the growth in total factor productivity, f, and another
resulting from the economy’s propensity to move to its steady-state level
if, for some reason (shocks, initial conditions, etc.), it lies away from it.
The rate at which the economy closes the gap between its current in-
come and its potential or steady-state level is represented by l (4). The
steady-state level is, in turn, determined by the parameters of the produc-
tion function and by the rates of accumulation of the productive factors:
yT+t – yT =V
s +fT +b–1 [as*Tk +gs*Th – (a +g) log (n*T +f +d)] [II.3]
where s*k is the logarithm of the rate of investment, s*h represents the log-
arithm of the rate of accumulation of human capital, and n* is the growth
rate of the population, all evaluated at their steady-state level; d is th  de-
preciation rate of capital which will be assumed equal to 3 %, while the
two constants combine different parameters of the model and the starting
level of technology (AT).
This structure allows us to test the different hypotheses considered in
this chapter. First, the presence of the rates of factor accumulation in
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( 2 ) In particular, unlike those equations that do not include the catching-up compo-
nent, the convergence equation provides a way of controlling the level of per capita income
when analyzing the determinants of its growth rate. This turns out to be of crucial impor-
tance to obtain a significant correlation between growth and inflation.
(3) In the original formulation of Solow (1956), the rate of technological progress is ex-
ogenous, although in more recent models it can be explained by the set of resources as-
signed to research, market size, learning-by-doing, etc.
(4) This rate can be written as: l = (1 – a – g) (f +d + n*).
[II.3] is useful to discriminate between the two channels through which
macroeconomic imbalances can affect the growth rate. If inflation re-
duces total factor productivity, we could expect a significant coefficient of
the rate of inflation in equation [II.5]. In this case, the productivity index
(At) might be assumed to evolve as in [II.4] (Cozier and Selody (1992)),
which reflects the influence of both the inflation rate (p) nd its variability
(s):
At = A0 exp (ft) exp (m1pt) exp (m2st) [II.4]
The empirical specification is then given by:
yT+t – yT =ft + (1 – e
–lt)
[V – yT +fT + m1pT +m2sT +
+b–1 (as*Tk +gs*Th – (a +g) log (n*T +f +d))]
[II.5]
If inflation affects growth solely through its impact on investment (sk), the
rate of inflation should be non significant in a model like [II.5](5). Unless
when necessary we shall not impose the parametric restrictions in the
previous equations and we shall focus in the linear version [II.5’] instead,
yT+t– yT =C0 +C1T + C2yT +C3s*Tk +C4s*Th +
+C5 log (n*T +f +d) + C6pT +C7sT
[II.5’]
Second, the exogenous growth model specifies the determinants of both
the long-run level of per capita income and of the sustained growth rate.
Inflation can affect one and/or the other, although the implications in
terms of welfare are different(6). According to the specification of equa-
tion [II.4], the impact of inflation basically impinges on the potential level
of income, but not on sustained growth (represented by f). To examine
the latter possibility, we shall also consider an alternative specification,
[II.4’], which allows for the influence of inflation on the long-run growth
rate(7):
At = A0 exp [(f +f’p)t] exp [m1p] [II.4’]
such that the equation to be estimated would be represented by:
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(5) In this case, the impact of inflation on growth in the long run should be evaluated
by estimating investment equations.
(6) See Thornthon (1996) for a discussion of this issue.
(7) This is the specification proposed by Motley (1994). The variability of inflation is
excluded in order to simplify the expression.
yT+t – yT = (f +f’p)t + (1 – e
–lt)
[V – yT + (f +f’p)T + m1pT +
+b–1 (as*Tk +gs*Th – (a +g) log (n*T +f +d))]
[II.6]
In next section we estimate the elasticity of growth with respect to infla-
tion in models [II.5], [II.5’] and [II.6].
II.2. Estimation of the effect of inflation: main results
Table II.1 displays the cross-section estimates of model [II.5] for the
sample period, which imposes the restrictions implied by the technology
of constant returns to scale. As a first approximation to the long-run per-
formance of each country we proceed to take sample averages of the rel-
evant variables for each country. Thus we are left with 24 observations, in
which T = 1960, and t = 36. The standard model in column 1 displays a
non-significant coefficient for the human capital proxy as well as a rate of
convergence along the lines of those usually estimated for the OECD
countries (l = 2.1) [Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992)]. When the model is
augmented with the inflation rate (column 2), the technological parame-
ters remain largely unchanged, and the inflation effect is found to be neg-
ative and significant (m = –0.028, t = 3.87)(8).
Although 36 years averages are useful to capture long-run correla-
tions, they leave us with a severe limitation of degrees of freedom that
may induce spurious results driven by the presence of some outliers in
the sample. To assess the importance of this effect the model has been
estimated excluding the countries with higher average inflation during the
sample period: Spain, Greece, Portugal, Iceland, and Turkey (ranging
from 9 % to 30 %). The only significant change is found when Iceland is
excluded (column 3). This country has experienced a very high average
inflation (the second in the sample, with values above 40 % in some
years) but it has also achieved a high growth rate, despite its modest
1960 per capita income. These features generate a downward bias in the
estimated convergence rate and inflation effect (in absolute value), which
turns out to be non-negligible in a small sample as the one we are deal-
ing with. Excluding Iceland from the sample the effect of inflation is signif-
icantly larger (m = –0.042, t = 6.96)
The cross-section estimates of Table II.1 give us a hint about the long-
run correlation among income and inflation, but a closer inspection of the
robustness of this correlation requires taking into account the time series
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(8) The variability of inflation is never significant.
dimension of the sample. To do that, and still smooth cyclical variations, a
pooled sample of four years averages of the variables of interest is used in
what follows. Tables II.2 and II.3 display the estimated steady-state and
convergence equations, using one and two-periods-lagged regressors as
instruments. The effect of inflation is negative and significant in most spec-
ifications. The models in columns 1 and 2 of Table II.2 represent different
linear versions (equation [II.5’]) of the convergence equation. As predicted
by the neoclassical model, the parameter of initial per capita income is
negative and highly significant, both when steady-state variables are in-
cluded (conditional convergence) and when they are not (unconditional
convergence). In column 2, the coefficients of the input accumulation rates
have the expected sign, although all of them are non-significant(9). The
estimated parameter of the trend, which according to the theoretical model
is approximating the rate of technological progress, has an unexpected
negative sign(10). On the other hand, the trend coefficient has the expect-
ed positive sign in the steady-state equation (columns 3 and 4), but the
values of the coefficients of the accumulation rates suggest a far too large
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TABLE II.1
NON-LINEAR CROSS-SECTION MODELS
Dependent Variable. . . . . . . . . Dy Dy Dy
a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.55 0.41 0.28
(3.82) (2.73) (1.70)
g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.08 0.04 –0.10
(0.64) (0.32) (0.71)
m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — –0.028 –0.042
(3.87) (6.96)
l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .021 .031 .104
R2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.60 0.73 0.82
s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.179 0.150 0.126
(3) (*)(2)(1)
Notes: Non linear least squares.
(*) Excluding Iceland.
(9) This result is common to many other papers in the growth literature using cross-
sections.
(10) A possible interpretation for this result is that the trend may be capturing the pro-
cess of sustained reduction in the rate of growth of per capita income suffered by OECD
countries during part of the sample period. We have tried alternative characterizations of
technological progress: first, including time dummies instead of the linear trend and, second,
imposing a rate of technological progress of 2 %. The estimated coefficients, including that
of inflation, do not change significantly. These results are not reported to save space.
share of human capital in the production function. The coefficient of the in-
flation rate is negative and significant, both in the convergence and in the
steady-state equation, whereas no significant effect is found from the vari-
ability of inflation (11). When the factor accumulation rates are included
(columns 2 and 4) the size of the inflation effect is slightly smaller than
when they are omitted (columns 1 and 3), but it is still significant. These
results suggest that there are two channels by which inflation influences
growth: first, through a reduction in the propensity to invest, and second,
through a reduction in the efficiency in the use of inputs.
Non-linear versions of the convergence equation [II.5] in Table I I . 3
confirm the negative correlation among inflation and the rate of growth of
economies across the OECD. The estimated parameters of the accumu-
lation rates in the steady-state equation (column 1) are quite far from the
usually obtained in the empirical literature. The effect of inflation is nega-
tive and significant. The estimated coefficients in the convergence equa-
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TABLE II.2
LINEAR MODELS
Equation [II.5’]
Dependent variable. . . . . Dy Dy y* y*
y 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.006 –0.005 0.067 0.051
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2.44) (1.96) (6.21) (4.41)
y 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.082 –0.092 — —
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (4.63) (4.79)
y 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — 0.029 — 0.053
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1.02) (0.41)
y 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — 0.012 — 0.401
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (0.57) (4.36)
y 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — –0.070 — –0.629
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (0.80) (1.73)
y 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.0021 –0.0020 –0.022 –0.018
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3.53) (3.18) (10.85) (7.95)
R2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.25 0.29 0.47 0.54
s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.058 0.057 0.275 0.260
(4)(3)(2)(1)
Notes: Estimation method: instrumental variables. Instruments: constant, trend and first and second
order lags of the regressors and second lag of the dependent variable. Absolute t-ratios in parentheses.
( 1 1 ) As in the cross-section models, this is a feature of all specifications tried and,
thus, the equations presented hereafter exclude this variable.
tion (column 2) look similar to those found in the cross-section with an im-
plicit rate of convergence around 3.1 %. Again, the effect of inflation is
negative and significant.
Multi-country pooling estimates, in which typically the number of
countries is not very large, are very often criticised on the basis of the
large influence of a few extreme values. In particular, the estimated nega-
tive correlation among inflation and income might well stem from the ex-
perience of some high inflation countries. As a first approximation to this
issue we have carried out some tests of the sensitivity of the inflation co-
efficient to the sample definition. The most noticeable change in the esti-
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TABLE II.3
NON-LINEAR MODELS
Equation [II.5]
Dependent variable . . . . . y* Dy Dy Dy
Vs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.14 — — —
(0.20)
Vc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — –2.01 –0.49 –0.02
(1.71) (0.52) (0.71)
a. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.05 0.30 0.27 0.30
(0.71) (2.99) (2.78) (2.83)
g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.28 0.17 0.10 0.14
(5.19) (2.11) (1.28) (1.59)
fss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.05 — — —
(4.58)
fc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — –0.03 –0.00 –0.03
(1.10) (0.12) (1.41)
f’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — — 0.003
(2.07)
m1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.019 –0.019 –0.025 –0.13
(9.10) (5.46) (7.77) (2.29)
l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — 0.031 0.035 0.032
R2ss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.55 — — —
Rc
2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — 0.26 0.29 0.26
sss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.256 — — —
sc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — 0.058 0.055 0.058
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Notes:
— Estimation method: see notes in Table II.2
— Absolute t-ratios in parentheses.
mated coefficient takes place when Iceland is excluded from the sample.
In such case (column 3 of Table II.3) the correlation among inflation and
growth is significantly higher than when it is included. This is not surpris-
ing since Iceland being the country with the second highest average infla-
tion within the OECD, is also a high-income fast-growth economy which
may be generating a downwards bias (in the absolute value of) the
growth-inflation correlation.
The negative effect of inflation on per capita income seems to be ro-
bust both in the steady-state and in the convergence equation. This how-
ever does not settle an important issue, namely whether high inflation
rates lead to a permanent fall in the rate of growth of income per capita or
if this effect is just permanent on the level of that variable, but temporary
on the rate of growth. To discriminate between these effects we have es-
timated equation [II.6], allowing for an effect of inflation both on the
steady-state level of income (m) and on the permanent component of the
growth rate (f‘). Both these coefficients are negative and significant when
they are introduced individually, but when they are jointly included in the
model (column 4) the effect on the trend component takes an unexpected
positive sign. This would indicate that the negative effect of inflation im-
pinges upon the level of per capita income but not on the sustainable rate
of growth of the economy. Thus, the impact on the growth rate is transito-
ry, as long as convergence is under way.
Summing up, the analysis in this section, in accordance with other stud-
ies, supports the evidence of an adverse influence of inflation on growth.
As regards the size of this effect, if we take the coefficient in column 3 of
Table II.3 as a reliable estimate of the long-run effect of inflation upon
growth, an increase in average inflation by one percentage point reduces
per capita growth by 0.08 points per year. This fall in the growth rate is not
permanent but it lasts for a long period leading to a permanent reduction in
steady-state per capita income of 2.5 %(12). However, before drawing any
policy implication out of these figures it is convenient to take a closer look
at the relationship between inflation and growth, trying to correct for some
biases that might arise in specifications like the ones studied so far.
II.3. Country-specific effects and the cost of inflation
The use of information for wide groups of countries in empirical analy-
ses of economic growth makes it possible to focus on the low-frequency
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(12) To make these computations we use model [II.5]. The short run increase in the
rate of growth is obtained as [100(1 – e–lt)m1/4] = 0.08, whereas the long run increase in per
capita income is simply [100m1] = 2.5. When Iceland is included in the sample, these figures
are 0.05 and 1,9 % respectively.
properties of the data. This requires taking time series averages and,
thus, having information about different countries or regions prevents
from running in a severe shortage of degrees of freedom. However, this
approach imposes a very strong restriction, namely that the data for all
the economies of the sample stem from the same theoretical distribution,
i.e. the technological parameters are homogeneous across countries.
This assumption is seldom explicitly tested, although its empirical implica-
tions may be very important [see Pesaran and Smith (1995)]. The exis-
tence of technological differences in the rates of technical progress or, as
it is more likely, in the initial conditions of each country, goes against that
assumption and might render lagged regressors inappropriate as instru-
ments in growth equations, generating biased estimates of the parame-
ters of interest(13).
In this section, we test whether the estimated negative effect of infla-
tion on growth is biased due to the omission of these country-specific
(time-invariant) effects. The main results are summarised in Table II.4. In
column (1), the linear model (equation [II.5’]) has been estimated under
the assumption that the omitted individual effects are not correlated with
the regressors. The random effects estimates, and in particular the coeffi-
cient of the inflation rate, resemble very much those of the basic model
depicted in column (2) of Table II.2. Nevertheless, the reasons to include
country-specific effects in the model suggest that the assumption of lack
of correlation among these and the regressors might not be appropriate
in this setting. Thus, in what follows we focus on the fixed effect esti-
mates, which we compute including dummies in the linear convergence
equation. All the models have been estimated by instrumental variables
(see note of Table II.4, for details). When we add a dummy variable for
each country (column 2) the explanatory power of most regressors
changes, as compared with the models in the previous section. In particu-
lar, while inflation still has a negative effect on income its t-statistic is now
lower (–0.75). The changes in the rest of the model are far more radical
though. First, whereas the negative trend coefficient was an unappealing
feature of the models in section II.3, this coefficient now becomes positive
and significant, with a reasonable point estimate of 0.03. Second, the
point estimates of the technological coefficients are now either non-signif-
icant or wrongly signed. In fact, excluding the accumulation rates from the
equations, the negative correlation between growth and inflation be-
comes significant with a t-statistic of –2.06 (column 3). Finally, several
country dummies are not different from zero, which means that the model
might be over-parameterised.
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( 1 3 ) For a discussion of the importance of individual effects in the constant term of
convergence equations see Knight, Loayza and Villanueva (1993), Islam (1995), Barro
(1996) and Andrés and Boscá (2000), among others.
The search for a more parsimonious specification proceeds along
the following steps. Starting from the model with a dummy variable for
each country, the non-significant dummy variables have been removed,
setting aside the one with the lowest t-statistic each time. As a second
step, these excluded variables have been added again, one at a time,
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TABLE II.4
CONVERGENCE EQUATION WITH INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS
Equation [II.5’]. Dependent variable y
C1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02
(1.80) (2.87) (3.57) (1.77) (3.31)
C2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.08 –0.57 –0.45 –0.29 –0.38
(4.43) (4.67) (5.56) (4.30) (5.99)
C3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.06 –0.16 — 0.05 0.03
(2.34) (1.58) (1.58) (1.16)
C4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.01 0.05 — 0.04 0.04
(0.24) (0.69) (1.00) (1.81)
C5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.03 0.02 — –0.10 –0.11
(0.45) (0.09) (1.08) (1.43)
C6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.0018 –0.0009 –0.0016 –0.0026 –0.0025
(3.23) (0.75) (2.06) (3.34) (3.34)
R2 0.31 0.35 0.47 0.46 0.43
s 0.056 0.059 0.053 0.052 0.052
C6 (LI). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.0077 –0.0119
(1.70) (4.61)
C6 (HI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.0016 –0.0022
(2.05) (2.50)
C6 (HI-ICL). . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.0013 –0.0020
(1.33) (2.27)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Notes:
— HI: sample of 6 countries with the inflation rate above the OECD average; LI: OECD excluding HI
countries; HI-ICL: as HI, excluding Iceland. 
— Estimation method col. (1): random effects; Instruments: lags of the regressors. 
— Estimation method cols. (2)-(5): Country-dummies; Instruments: as in Table II.2 plus country dum-
mies and inflation variability.
— Dummy variables included:
— Columns (2) and (3): one for each country except Australia.
— Column (4): one for: each of the following countries: Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Spain, United
Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Portugal, Iceland, Turkey and United
States.
— Column (5), one for each of the following countries: Spain, Greece and Turkey and one for each of
the following country groups: Ireland and Portugal; Canada and Germany; Switzerland, Luxembourg, Ice-
land and United States; and Finland, New Zealand and United Kingdom.
retaining those with a t-ratio greater than 1.5(14). Every time a dummy
variable is added back into the model, the process is reinitiated. This
procedure does not involve the analysis of every single possible specifi-
cation according to all the combinations of country-specific constants.
However, it provides a model selection procedure that allows us to test,
at least twice, the marginal significance of each dummy variable: first,
against a more general model (with all the country-specific dummies)
and next against a more restricted one. The model in column 4 sum-
marises the final outcome of this specification process. The results do
not change very much with respect to those in column 1, except in that
now the coefficient of the inflation rate is negative and significant and its
size is larger than that obtained for the model without individual effects.
Furthermore, this result is quite robust to the set of country-specific dum-
mies included in the regression. The same search process has been
also carried out for different sub-samples with different average inflation
rates. The point estimates of the inflation coefficient, along with its confi-
dence interval, are depicted in Figure II.1. The coefficient of inflation
turns out to be larger and more significant whenever high inflation coun-
tries are not considered. Hence, the estimated correlation between infla-
tion and growth (or income) does not depend on the presence of high in-
flation countries in the sample.
Taking column 4 as a starting point, in the model in column 5 individu-
al dummies are clustered into country-group dummy variables. The t-
statistic of the inflation rate is still very high in absolute value (–3.34)( 1 5 ) .
The country groups in column 5 have been defined according to the size
of the individual effect. Turkey’s individual effect is negative (–0.34) as
compared with the excluded countries, followed by Greece (–0.15), Ire-
land and Portugal (–0.14), Spain (–0.13), New Zealand, Finland and the
United Kingdom (–0.05). On the other hand, Canada and Germany (0.02),
Iceland (0.07) and Switzerland, Luxembourg and the United States (0.10)
display a positive individual effect on the growth rate(16). The estimated
individual effects reveal a systematic pattern which, if ignored, could have
led to a bias in the estimated effect of inflation. The individual effect is
strongly correlated with the level of per capita income achieved at the end
of the sample period. Thus, omitting the individual effect, the model would
underestimate the growth of the richest countries overestimating that of
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(14) If the threshold level of the t-ratio is 2.0, the final specification is more parsimo-
nious. Nevertheless, the estimated long run coefficient of inflation does not depart very
much from that in column 4.
(15) As in column 2, the coefficients for the input accumulation rates are not signifi-
cant. The exclusion of these variables does not worsen substantially the fit of the equation
and further increases the significance level of the inflation rate.
(16) The omitted countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Nether-
lands, Italy, Japan, Norway and Sweden.
the poorest countries. Since there is a negative correlation, at the OECD
level, between per capita income in 1993 and the average inflation rate,
excluding the individual effects is a source of potential upwards bias in the
estimation of the effect of inflation. Indeed, although the estimated coeffi-
cient of inflation remains largely unchanged, as compared with that in
Table II.2, there is, nevertheless a significant change in the point estimate
of the long-run effect of inflation once country-specific dummies are in-
cluded in the model. The coefficient of initial GDP is now almost five times
larger than the one in Table II.2, thus the estimated long-run cost of in-
flation is now lower. A permanent increase in one percentage point leads
to a 0.9 % permanent fall in output. This time, though, the transition period
is much shorter since a higher coefficient of initial GDP means that con-
vergence to the steady-state is much faster too.
Although OECD economies share certain common institutional fea-
tures, their inflation performances are rather different. Once we have a
more accurate estimate of the long-run cost of inflation we can address the
issue of whether this cost varies according to the level of inflation or not.
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FIGURE II.1
SENSITIVITY OF THE INFLATION COEFFICIENT TO THE SAMPLE DEFINITION (a)
N o t e s :
(a) The figure depicts the estimated coefficient for inflation in model [II.5] (bars) as well as the 95%
confidence intervals (lines) for different samle definitions.
(b) Sample definition:
1. High inflation countries (above OECD average).
2. High inflation countries (excluding Iceland).
3. OECD.
4. OECD excluding Turkey.
5. OECD excluding Turkey and Iceland.
6. OECD excluding Turkey, Iceland and Portugal.
7. OECD excluding Turkey, Iceland, Portugal and Greece.
8. OECD excluding Turkey, Iceland, Portugal, Greece and Spain.
9. Low inflation countries (below OECD average).
The different perspectives adopted to analyse the linearity of the inflation
effect have led to contradictory results. For instance, Barro (1995), esti-
mating different coefficients for different levels of inflation, finds a greater
effect of inflation on growth the greater the inflation level(17). Motley
(1994), estimates the growth model for different sub-samples and con-
cludes the opposite. We have tried these two approaches in equation [II.5’]
and found that they also yield somewhat different results for the OECD, al-
though the coefficients of inflation in different sub-samples where not very
precisely estimated. In general, though, the coefficient corresponding to
lower inflation rates tends to be higher although, in some cases, with a
lower t ratio. This would indicate that the benefits of lower inflation are in-
deed higher at low rates, although the functional form might be inappropri-
ate to capture this result. As an alternative, we have estimated the basic
model allowing for a non-linear effect of inflation on growth. Including p
and p2, both coefficients are significant while the positive coefficient on p2
indicates that the marginal cost of inflation is positive but decreasing with
its level. Two alternative specifications that allow for a falling marginal cost
of inflation have also been tried. In these, inflation is represented by log(p)
and the ratio (p / (1 + p)), respectively(18). In all these specifications the
fit is better than in the models with the level of inflation.
A further test of linearity has been carried out in the model in which
inflation enters in logs. In panel A of Table II.5, a different coefficient is al-
lowed for log (p) depending on the level of inflation. These coefficients
are always negative and significant but not statistically different. As an al-
ternative approach, the homogeneity assumption may be relaxed by esti-
mating the convergence equation for different sub-samples. This ap-
proach allows all the parameters, and not only the coefficient of inflation,
to vary across sub-samples. The results are summarised in panel B of
Table II.5. The effect of inflation is negative and significant for low (al-
though not for very low) as well as for high (and very high) inflation coun-
tries and the coefficient of log (p) is similar across different sub-sample
specifications(19). The results of these two approaches lead us to con-
clude that the elasticity of income with respect to inflation does not
change significantly with the level of inflation. If anything, this tells us that
it may be more costly for a low-inflation country to concede an additional
(and permanent) point of inflation than it would be for a country with a
higher starting rate(20).
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(17) Although the null of linearity cannot be rejected [see also Barro (1996)].
(18) Gylfason and Herbertsson (1996) propose this nonlinear transformation.
(19) The coefficient of initial GDP is also similar across the specifications in panel B of
Table II.4. Thus, the hypothesis of homogeneity in the long-run elasticity cannot be rejected
either.
(20) The exercises on Table II.5 have been carried out for different inflation regimes
and also for different specifications of the equation and the inflation term. The overall picture
Table II.6 shows the long-run impact on income of one percentage
point permanent reduction of inflation, for a variety of specifications of the
effect of inflation(21). When using the whole sample of OECD countries,
the estimated long-run benefit of a reduction of inflation from 20 % to 19%
varies from 0.30 % to 0.80 %, with an average value of 0.5 %. At lower in-
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TABLE II.5
LINEARITY OF THE INFLATION EFFECT
Elasticities of income with respect to inflation in estimates of the linear
version of the convergence equation
A. Whole sample estimates with specific inflation coefficients
Low inflation(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.098
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2.64)
Medium inflation(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.071
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3.71)
High inflation(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.074
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (4.97)
B. Sub-sample estimates
Low inflation(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.064
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2.93)
High inflation(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.058
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (4.88)
Very low inflation(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.046
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1.45)
Very high inflation(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.063
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (4.37)
Notes:
— Estimation method: see notes in Table II.2.
— Absolute t-ratios in parentheses.
(a) Low inflation: observations with inflation lower than 6%; Medium inflation: observations with infla-
tion between 6% and 12%; High inflation: observations with inflation greater than 12%.
(b) Low inflation: countries with average inflation lower than the median; High inflation: countries with
average inflation greater than the median.
(c) Very low inflation: eight countries with the lowest inflation. Very high inflation: eight countries with
the highest inflation.
that comes out of these exercises is the same. The coefficient of the inflation term is negative
in most cases and it tends to be bigger (in absolute value) at low inflation rates, although with
lower t-statistics as well. In a few specifications the coefficient for very low inflation rates (be-
low 3-4 %) is positive, although never significant. This issue deserves a more careful scruti-
ny, since it might well be that inflation ceases to be costly at all at very low levels. Since we
have very few data points with inflation under 3 % in our sample, we have not been able to
pursue this further. Sarel (1996) concludes that the cut-off point might be at an 8 % rate of in-
flation. However, both the model and the data used differ from ours in several respects.
(21) All models include country-specific constants.
flation levels (from 4 % to 3 %), the benefit of the same reduction in infla-
tion is higher, with an average 1 % increase in steady-state income. These
estimated values are all rather similar except for the specification in loga-
rithms, which overrates the benefits of disinflation at low inflation levels.
These benefits are not large, but it must be noticed the estimated con-
vergence rate is higher than the usual 2-3 %. This means that the transi-
tion period until the increase in GDP actually takes place is shorter; thus, it
would not take the representative economy much time to reap the full ben-
efits of a sustained disinflation. In Table II.7 we compare the cost of infla-
tion estimated in the basic model (column 2, Table II.2) with the one ob-
tained in the model with country specific effects (column 4, TableII.4). The
estimated benefit from a permanent reduction in the inflation rate by one
percentage point is higher in the former (2.2 % versus 0.9%). Neverthe-
less, since this is a steady-state effect and the convergence rates also dif-
fer across models (2.4 % versus 8.6 %), the relevant comparison should
be made in present value terms, which makes the outcome dependent on
the discount rate. According to the figures in this example, for discount
rates slightly above 4 % the benefit of disinflation is larger in models with
faster dynamics, despite the lower per capita income gain in the steady-
state. Hence, the present value of the per capita income gain might well
be within the range of those found in other studies.
II.4. Causality analysis
The models studied in previous sections focus on the contemporane-
ous correlation between inflation and growth, while the literature presents
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TABLE II.6
LONG RUN EFFECT OF INFLATION ON PER CAPITA INCOME (a)
p, p. . . . . . . . . . . 1.60 % 0.80 % 2.10 % 1.25 %
p/(1 + p) . . . . . . 0.50 % 0.40 % 0.95 % 0.70 %
Log(p) . . . . . . . . 1.40 % 0.30 % 2.10 % 0.40 %
p . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.30 % 0.30 % 0.55 % 0.55 %
Model (b)
Low p(c) High p(d) Low p(c) High p(d)
OECD OECD (Ex. Iceland)
Notes:
(a) The long run effect is calculated as the partial derivative of income per capita with respect to in-
flation in the long-run solution of the model. In the linear case (last row) this is simply the coefficient of in-
flation divided by the coefficient on initial income. In the other cases there is an additional term which de-
pends on average inflation. The model has been estimated including all country dummies, which make
the results of the linear case slightly different from other reported in this chapter.
(b) The variables in the first column indicate the way in which inflation enters in each model.
(c) Low p: reducing inflation from 4 % to 3 %
(d) High p: reducing inflation from 20 % to 19 %
— Initial GDP non instrumented.
arguments in favour of causality in both directions. This might generate a
non-negligible bias in the estimation of the magnitude of costs associated
with high inflation. The correlation between inflation and growth depends
on the nature of the shocks that hit an economy; hence, the estimated
negative correlation between inflation and growth might well be driven by
the predominance of negative supply shocks during the sample period. To
test this possibility we have estimated the convergence equation for two
periods: one in which demand shocks predominated (1961-1972 and
1989-1996), and the other in which supply shocks have been probably
more significant (1973-1988)(22). The results of this split are shown in
Table II.8, where we present only the coefficient on inflation for both the
OLS and the instrumental variable (IV) estimation. As expected, the IV co-
efficient is higher, in absolute value, than the OLS coefficient for the first
period given the nature of the expected bias. Both coefficients are similar
for the second period. But in all cases, the coefficients are negative and
significant, meaning that the negative supply shocks that hit the OECD
economies during most of the second half of the sample period are not pri-
marily responsible for the estimated negative correlation association be-
tween inflation and growth. If this had been the case, we ought to find a
positive coefficient for the first period, at least in the OLS estimation. The
finding of negative coefficients for both periods strengthens the view that
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TABLE II.7
PER CAPITA INCOME GAIN FROM REDUCING INFLATION:
STEADY-STATE AND PRESENT VALUE
Steady-state per capita income gain( ). . . . . . . . . 2.2% 0.9%
l (b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.4% 8.6%
Half-life per capita income gain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1% 0.45%
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .(28 years) (8 years)
Present value: discount rate 4% (c). . . . . . . . . . . . 0.37% 0.33%
Present value: discount rate 5% (c). . . . . . . . . . . . 0.28% 0.30%
Country effectsBasic model
Notes:
(a) Computed as the coefficient of inflation (Y 6) divided by the coefficient on initial income (Y 2) in the
converge equation augmented with country dummies (equation [II.5’]). From equations [II.5] and [II.5’],
Y 2=–(1 –e
– lt ) and Y 6 =–(1 – e
– lt )m 1. Thus, m 1 =– Y 6/Y 2.
(b) From equations [II.5] and [II.5’], Y 2 = –(1– e
– lt ), i.e. l =–0.25ln(1 + Y 2).
( c ) Discounted present value of half-life gain (expressed in percentage points of steady-state per
capita income).
( 2 2 ) Similar results were obtained when we split the period up in other two parts:
1961-1976, for demand shocks predominance, and 1977-1996, for supply shocks predomi-
nance.
there is indeed a genuine negative effect of inflation upon growth that does
not rely on the influence of supply shocks on inflation and growth.
In order to pursue this issue more thoroughly, this section analyses the
statistical causality, as formulated by Granger, of inflation to growth and
vice-versa. This perspective is broader than that of convergence equa-
tions in several ways. First, the analysis of causality focuses on the study
of non-contemporaneous effects of one variable on the other. Second, us-
ing a more flexible specification, we avoid the imposition of the parametric
restrictions of the neo-classical growth model, which might make the cor-
relation that concerns us here less clear. The analysis of causality carried
out in this section does not put theoretical growth models aside though.
Economic theory suggests a series of growth determinants that can be in-
corporated into the information set in the tests of causality.
To analyse the causality running from the rate of inflation to the level
of per capita income, a test is run on the joint significance of {d1, ...dp} in
the model(23):
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TABLE II.8
INFLATION EFFECT FOR DIFFERENT PERIODS
Coefficients of inflation in a linear version of the convergence equation(a)
A. Demand shocks predominance period(b)
OLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.002
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2.66)
IV (c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.003
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3.36)
B. Supply shocks predominance period(b)
OLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.005
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (4.82)
IV (c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.005
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3.09)
Notes:
(a) Equation [II.5’] excluding the trend.
(b) Demand shocks predominance perior: 1961-1972 and 1989-1996. Supply shocks predominance
period: 1973-1988.
(c) Instruments: constant, first and second order lags of the regressors and second lag of the depen-
dent variable.
— Absolute t-ratios in parentheses.
(23) Testing the causality from the rate of inflation to the growth rate only entails adding
a linear restriction on the coefficients in C(L), and writing per capita income in first differ-
ences. The results of the causality tests to the growth rate are quite similar to those of the
causality tests to the level of per capita income and will not be reported here to save space.
yt = A + C(L)yt + D(L)pt + G(L)Xt +mt [II.7]
where yt, pt are vectors (24x 1) of current observations of the logarithm
of per capita GDP and of the rate of inflation, respectively, for 24 member
countries of the OECD, Xt is a vector of additional regressors, suggested
by growth theory and A is a vector (24x 1) of constants. C(L), D(L) and
G(L) are matrices of order (24x 24) in which the elements outside the
main diagonal are zero and the element within the main diagonal is a
lagged polynomial of order p such as (for D(L), for example):
d1L + d2L
2 + d3L
3 + ... + dpL
p
The rejection of the null hypothesis that the dj’s are zero indicates that
current inflation helps to reduce the mean-squared error in the prediction
of per capita income and, therefore, that p causes y in the Granger
sense. Likewise, the causality from the growth rate to inflation is tested
through the joint significance of {e1, ... p} in:
pt = B + E(L)D yt + F(L)pt + H(L)Xt +«t [II.8]
where E(L), F(L) and H(L) are matrices of a structure similar to C(L) and
B is a vector (24x 1) of constants. The rejection of the null hypothesis
that the coefficients ej are zero indicates that Dy causes p.
The elements of the matrices A and B, as well as the coefficients of
the lagged polynomials (in C(L), D(L), E(L), F(L), G(L) and H(L)), will be
assumed to be homogeneous among countries unless expressly stated
otherwise(24). The estimation of [II.7] and [II.8] raises several method-
ological issues, the most important one being the possibility that some
variables are non-stationary, in which case exclusion tests do not have a
standard distribution. There are several ways in which the hypothesis of
causality between integrated variables can be tested, making use of
statistics with asymptotic standard distribution. These procedures basical-
ly consist of a re-parameterisation of the model in order to obtain station-
ary regressors(25). The method proposed by Dolado and Lütkepohl
(1996) does not require a search for possible cointegration vectors which
is quite often a hazardous task in panel data models. These authors pro-
pose the estimation of a VAR in levels of order p+1. The exclusion test
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(24) Since this section applies annual data relating to the variables of interest for 24
OECD countries, it departs from the traditional approach in the empirical literature on
growth, which avoids using annual information. Nevertheless, an increasing number of stud-
ies tend to use raw annual data. Moreover, in the dynamic analysis of causality, models
based on time averages can be considered as restricted versions of models that use annual
data. As regards the role of individual effects in multi-country regressions, we shall take
them into account in this section by considering several specifications in which vectors A
and B include a different constant for each country (ai, bi).
(25) See Sims, Stock and Watson (1990).
performed on the p first lags is thus distributed asymptotically as an F,
while the efficiency loss is compensated by the simplicity of the test(26).
The application of this method requires knowing the true order p; rather
than discussing the lag structure in detail, we present results for a suffi-
ciently broad range of lags that ensure the stationarity of the residuals.
Table II.9 displays the results of the causality tests from the rate of in-
flation to the level of per capita income. It summarises the significance
level for the null hypothesis that the inflation coefficients are jointly non-
significant in alternative specifications for [II.7]. In addition, it gives the t-
statistic for the sum of these coefficients. The exclusion test in [II.7] has
been performed for six different structures of lags (p going from 3 to 8)
and for five sets of additional regressors (Xt). Model 1 includes neither
additional regressors (gj =0) nor constant individual effects. Model 2 in-
cludes individual constant effects so that A is a vector of different con-
stants, one for each country. Model 3 incorporates, in addition to individu-
al effects, several other regressors such as a linear trend, the savings ra-
tio, the rate of schooling and the growth rate of the population, all of them
contemporaneous. Model 4 is similar to the previous model, but with the
first lag (instead of the current) accumulation rates. Finally, model 5 incor-
porates, in addition to the regressors of model 4, the first lag of money
growth, exports growth and public spending as a percentage of GDP. The
results in Table II.9 may be summarised as follows. In 22 out of the 30
considered cases, the null hypothesis that the inflation coefficients are
jointly non-significant, and hence that inflation does not cause income,
can be rejected at the 10 % level. Furthermore, the sum of the lagged co-
efficients of inflation is negative in 29 out of the 30 cases. This would im-
ply that higher inflation today anticipates lower income in the future. How-
ever, the evidence of a long run effect of inflation upon income is not un-
equivocal since the sum of the coefficients of the inflation lags is signifi-
cantly different from zero (at the 10 % level) in just a half of the cases.
This is worrisome since a non-significant long run coefficient can be inter-
preted as if the effect of inflation on the long run level of income is not
permanent, casting some doubts on the validity of the correlation found in
previous sections.
The last two columns of Table II.9 indicate the results for the model
with the largest set of additional regressors: individual effects, lagged ac-
cumulation rates and several macroeconomic variables. Many authors
have studied the relationship between long-term growth and the short-
term performance of economies(27). The main argument on which this
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(26) For an application of this method, see Andrés, Boscá and Doménech (1996).
(27) See Levine and Renelt (1992), Fischer (1993) and Andrés, Doménech and Moli-
nas (1996), among others, for alternative views of the influence of macroeconomic shocks
on growth.
relationship rests is that the shocks hitting an economy or the way eco-
nomic policy is conducted influence the agents’ accumulation decisions
and the way markets operate. Thus, a succession of negative shocks or
an inadequately designed fiscal or monetary policy may have effects that
go beyond the short term, affecting potential output and sustained
growth. If this argument is correct, the causal interpretation of the esti-
mated correlation between inflation and growth could be called into ques-
tion. The estimated correlation between growth and inflation could be due
simply to the fact that inflation approximates the impact of other macroe-
conomic variables with which it is strongly correlated. Including these
macroeconomic variables in the model makes it possible to isolate the in-
fluence of inflation on growth from the effect of other shocks. The results
indicate that after taking into account the effect of fiscal and monetary
policy and the export performance, the existence of causality of a nega-
tive sign from inflation to economic growth becomes more apparent. The
null hypothesis that inflation does not help to improve the prediction of the
future growth rate is clearly rejected in all cases. The statistic associated
with the sum of the coefficients of the inflation lags is negative in all cases
and statistically significant in most of them(28).
Although the results of these causality tests are not fully conclusive,
their importance is enhanced if we compare them with some similar tests
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TABLE II.9
CAUSALITY FROM INFLATION TO PER CAPITA INCOME
3 4 –2.75 9 –2.43 5 –2.58 23 –1.78 2 –2.93
4 11 –1.34 27 –0.93 15 –1.12 30 –0.01 4 –1.29
5 0 –2.97 3 –2.38 1 –2.69 10 –1.62 1 –2.52
6 0 –1.93 3 –1.73 2 –1.50 19 –1.01 1 –2.15
7 0 –0.40 2 –0.27 2 –0.48 6 0.24 1 –0.81
8 2 –1.11 5 –0.98 16 –1.50 23 –0.54 6 –1.68
Notes: 
x2 denotes the significance level for the null hypothesis that the inflation coefficients are jointhy non-
significant.
Model 1: Basic model with no individual effects nor additional regressors.
Model 2: Model with individual effects.
Model 3: Model with individual effects, a trend and accumulation rates (investment rate, schooling, rate
of growth of population).
Model 4: Model with individual effects, a trend and lagged (t-1) accumulation rates.
Model 5: As in model 4 including some lagged (t-1) macroeconomic indicators (money growth, exports
growth and public spending as a percentage of GDP).
Model 1
x2 t x2 t x2 t x2 t x2 t
p
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
(28) In four out of ten cases, at a 10 % significance level, and in three of them at the
5 % level.
relating growth to other variables such as investment in physical and hu-
man capital or public spending. Blömstrom, Lipsey and Zejan (1996)
show that growth always precedes investment, rather than the other way
round. Carrol and Weil (1993) obtain a similar result for the OECD sam-
ple. What these authors find is that most of the observed positive correla-
tion among investment and growth (or income) can be attributed to re-
verse causation. Reasoning on similar grounds, many authors suspect
that something of this kind might be behind the correlation among infla-
tion and growth [Kocherlakota (1996)].
Interestingly enough, unlike what happens with investment and
schooling, in this case the causality running from income growth to infla-
tion is indeed significant but with a sign that weakens, rather than
strengthens, the case for reverse causality. Table II.10 displays the re-
sults of the causality tests from growth to the rate of inflation. The exclu-
sion test in [II.8] has also been performed for six different structures of
lags (p going from 3 to 8) and for five sets of additional regressors (Xt).
As can be seen in Table II.10, causality from growth to inflation is not re-
jected in any of the 30 specifications analysed, thus we may conclude
that current growth rates help to explain the future course of the inflation
rate. The t-statistic of the long-run coefficient is always positive and sig-
nificant (at the 5 per cent significance level). Economic theory proposes
several explanations why rapid growth is associated with higher inflation
in the more or less immediate future. On the one hand, it could be a
movement along a negatively sloped Phillips curve, as prices respond af-
ter a period of rapid expansion in demand. Another interpretation is de-
rived from the so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect(29). According to
these authors, rapid economic growth is associated with rapid expansion
in the productivity of a country’s tradable goods sector, leading to an ap-
preciation of its currency. Insofar as the nominal exchange rate is not ad-
justed to produce this appreciation, domestic prices will grow faster. This
leading correlation of a positive sign indicates that the risk of a simultane-
ity downward bias in the estimation of inflation costs is considerable(30).
As a result, the contemporaneous correlation in the convergence equa-
tions could be regarded as a lower bound of the costs of inflation, which
would have to be adjusted upwards in absolute value.
In the light of this evidence, the results presented in this section have
an unequivocal interpretation. The current rate of inflation provides rele-
vant information on income prospects in OECD countries. In particular,
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(29) Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964).
(30) Andrés, Hernando and Krüger (1996) show that when observations under fixed
exchange rates are excluded from the sample, the size and the significance level of the co-
efficient of inflation in OECD convergence equations increase substantially.
cæteris paribus, higher inflation never anticipates a higher level of income
in the medium and long run. This effect is robust to alternative specifica-
tions and, most notably, survives even when accumulation rates and indi-
vidual effects are included among the set of regressors. Moreover, it can
be rejected that this leading correlation between inflation and income is
spurious and produced by the coincidence of inflationary tendencies and
slow growth in some economies. Even though the magnitude of the nega-
tive effect of inflation might be questioned, the results of this section tell
us that inflation does not appear to be neutral in the long run and that in
no case does the persistence of inflation favours rapid economic growth
in the future.
II.5. The role of the financial system in the growth-inflation link
As last section has emphasised, the joint evolution of inflation and the
rate of growth of an economy is the outcome of the decisions made by
private agents, the policy actions carried out by the public sector and the
shocks hitting each economy during a given period. Among the potential
candidates contributing to explain this joint determination, it is worth fo-
cussing in the potential role of the development of the financial system in
shaping the growth-inflation link for, at least, two reasons. First, the pro-
cess of financial liberalisation and innovation in the last two decades has
highlighted the importance of the financial system in the monetary policy
transmission mechanism by underscoring the ability of the financial inter-
mediaries to issue liquid assets, thereby, taking an active role in the pro-
cess of money creation. To this extent, the establishment of a stable fi-
nancial environment is an essential ingredient in the commitment of mon-
etary authorities in western economies to price stability.
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TABLE II.10
CAUSALITY FROM GROWTH TO INFLATION
3 0 3.72 0 4.26 0 4.06 0 4.15 0 3.74
4 0 5.92 0 6.00 0 5.10 0 5.37 0 4.81
5 0 5.40 0 5.51 0 4.75 0 4.81 0 4.35
6 0 5.30 0 5.41 0 4.75 0 4.94 0 4.61
7 0 4.35 0 5.06 0 4.37 0 4.38 0 4.14
8 0 4.53 0 4.87 0 4.60 0 4.60 0 4.32
Model 1
x2 t x2 t x2 t x2 t x2 t
p
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Notes: see Table II.9.
The second reason to focus on the role of the development of the fi-
nancial system in understanding the growth-inflation link is the renewed
attention paid to this potential role by recent theoretical research. On the
one hand, some models indicate that policies of “financial repression”
have adverse effects on long-run growth and are also associated to high
inflation rates(31). In particular, high inflation rates are usually consid-
ered as indicators of the intensity of such repression. According to the im-
plications of this class of models, the negative medium-term correlation
among inflation and growth might be driven by a third variable, namely by
the extent to which the public sector seeks to finance large deficits by im-
posing unwarranted regulations to the banking system. On the other
hand, another strand of the literature stresses the long-run effect of infla-
tion that comes through its interaction with the financial system. This sort
of models claims that high inflation exacerbates informational frictions af-
fecting financial markets, which play a crucial role to understand the link
between inflation and growth. If either of these were relevant channels
through which inflation affects growth, the coefficient of the inflation rate
in convergence equations should be affected in a significant manner by
the inclusion of measures of financial development.
In this section we jointly estimate the effects of financial development
and inflation on growth in order to ascertain whether the estimated nega-
tive long-run effect of inflation on growth withstands the presence of
banking and stock market indicators in otherwise standard convergence
regressions. Our results indicate, first, that the long-run costs of inflation
are not explained by policies of financial repression, and second, that if
inflation affects growth through its interaction with the financial market,
this is not the only (nor the most important) channel.
These results must be interpreted with caution. We have made use of
the set of proxies for financial development that is standard in the empiri-
cal literature. This choice is justified in order to make comparisons with
other empirical work easier. However, this choice is far from being un-
questionable. On the one hand, these standard indicators do not cover all
the agents or institutions that provide financial services (for instance,
bond markets or insurance companies are not represented in these indi-
cators). On the other hand, these indicators are mainly measuring the
size of the institution or market, but it would also be desirable to use mea-
sures of efficiency of the financial system as well. We believe that these
shortcomings are behind the weakness of the finance-growth relationship
we have found for our sample of OECD countries.
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(31) “Financial repression” policies include inflationary taxation, mandatory purchases
of public debt, ceilings on interest rates and other regulations of the financial system. See
Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for details.
This section starts with a brief survey of the theoretical results linking
inflation, growth and financial system development. The banking and
stock market indicators used in the analysis are discussed in subsection
II.5.2, whereas subsection II.5.3 presents the estimated effects of jointly
including inflation and financial variables in otherwise standard growth
equations.
II.5.1. Theoretical and empirical backgrounds
Before surveying the recent literature dealing with the joint evolution
of inflation, financial development and economic growth, it is worth briefly
mentioning the main results of the literature on the relationship between
financial development and growth. This strand of the literature is as ex-
tensive as that connecting inflation and growth (surveyed in chapterI ) .
Most of the theoretical work in this field deals with the potential impact of
financial development on growth assuming the former to be exoge-
n o u s(32). McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) were among the first to
provide theoretical foundations for the fact that the liberalisation and de-
velopment of financial markets favour economic growth(33). Subsequent
theoretical work has studied in depth this direction of causality running
from financial development to economic growth [Pagano (1993), Levine
(1997)]. The different mechanisms which explain how financial intermedi-
ation can affect growth may be classified in three groups: effects on the
saving rate, effects on the proportion of saving funnelled to investment
and effects on the efficiency in the allocation of capital.
Since the seminal work by Goldsmith (1969), numerous empirical
studies have analysed the relationship between the level of financial mar-
kets development and the rate of growth making use of large cross-coun-
try data sets. A strong positive correlation between growth and indicators
of financial development has been recurrently obtained, even after con-
trolling for most of the factors that have been usually considered as deter-
minants of growth(34).
In contrast to the previous models that focus on genuine effects of fi-
nancial development on economic growth and to the models described in
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(32) Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) is one remarkable exception.
(33) In his pioneering Theory of Economic Development, Schumpeter argued that the
services provided by financial intermediaries play a decisive role enhancing productivity and
fostering growth.
(34) The empirical literature has focused either on measures of banking activity [King
and Levine (1993a,b)] or on measures of stock market development [Atje and Jovanovic
(1993) and Levine and Zervos (1998)]. In both cases the statistical association between the
growth rate and the financial indicators seems to be equally robust.
chapter I analysing the effects of inflation on growth, two classes of mod-
els deal simultaneously with the role of these two variables in the process
of growth. On the one hand, a recent wave of theoretical articles has fo-
cused on the effects of inflation on growth that arise through its interac-
tion with financial markets. These papers show different channels where-
by high inflation exacerbates informational frictions afflicting financial
markets, thus, depressing the level of activity and generating a significant
cost in terms of future growth rates. De Gregorio and Sturzenegger
(1994a,b) present models in which the ability of financial intermediaries to
distinguish among heterogeneous firms is reduced as inflation rises lead-
ing to a larger share of credit allocated to less efficient firms. In contrast,
in the paper by Choi, Smith and Boyd (1996) inflation reduces real re-
turns to savings and makes more severe the adverse selection problems
in capital markets inducing a higher degree of credit rationing. Finally,
Huybens and Smith (1999) present a monetary growth model with a dif-
ferent kind of informational friction. In their model, there are multiple tech-
nologies for producing capital and some of them are subject to a standard
costly state verification problem. They show that higher rates of money
creation reduce the real return on all assets and, under certain condi-
tions, lead to a reduction in the volume of trading in equity markets. All of
these papers show to what extent financial market frictions may play a
crucial role to understand the relationship between inflation and growth.
On the other hand, recent theoretical work provides an alternative ex-
planation for the pattern of correlations among inflation, growth and finan-
cial markets development. This line of research argues that government
strategies of financing large deficits resorting to policies of financial re-
pression explains the negative correlation between inflation and the level
of activity in financial markets. First, the repression of the financial system
increases the transaction costs of converting illiquid to liquid assets and,
as a consequence, expands money demand. This expansion raises the
inflation tax base, generating incentives to inflate(35). Moreover, these
models predict that financial repression will also have adverse real effects
to the extent that a badly functioning financial sector decreases the effi-
ciency in the allocation of savings. As a consequence, these models sug-
gest that the negative effect of inflation on growth is spurious as both high
inflation and low economic growth are caused by policies of financial re-
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( 3 5 ) However, Espinosa and Yip (1996) present a model that generates a “Laffer
curve” type relation between inflation and repression. Thus, in some cases (when financial
repression is severe enough so that an informal financial sector emerges) liberalization may
be inflationary. Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) argue that policies of financial repression
have two different effects: an increase in the inflation tax base (due to the increase in mon-
ey demand) and a decrease in the income-tax base (implied by a reduction in income).
Thus, these authors suggest it is more likely that a government choose to repress the finan-
cial sector if tax evasion is large because in such a case the increase in the inflation tax
base is not offset by a substantial reduction in the income-tax base.
pression. In related theoretical research, Chari, Jones and Manuelli
(1996) compare the implications of several quantitative models to explain
the growth effects of inflation found in the literature. They conclude that
inflation per se does not have significant effects on growth, but financial
regulations and their interaction with inflation have substantial effects on
growth.
Summing up, these models indicate that policies of financial repres-
sion have adverse effects on long-run growth and are also associated to
high inflation rates. Thus, the negative correlation among these two vari-
ables is driven by a third one. On the other hand, according to the models
stressing financial market frictions, the real effects of inflation come
through its interaction with the financial system, reducing the efficiency
with which this sector operates and, thus, harming growth. If either of
these were relevant channels through which inflation affects growth, the
coefficient of the inflation rate in convergence equations should be dra-
matically affected by the inclusion of measures of financial development.
Before we test this hypothesis, next section is devoted to study the
causality relationships among these variables.
II.5.2. Indicators of financial development
The construction of synthetic indicators of the volume of services pro-
vided by the financial system is not an easy task. First, because the ser-
vices provided are very diverse (management of the payment system,
mobilisation of savings, information gathering, risk diversification, exerting
corporate control), and second, because the agents that provide these fi-
nancial services are also heterogeneous (banks, securities markets, in-
surance companies, among others). As a result, there is a wide spectrum
of indicators of financial development used in this field(36). In this paper,
we use the set of proxies for banking development proposed by King and
Levine (1993a,b) that has been recurrently used in most of the subse-
quent empirical work. Additionally, we consider market capitalisation as a
measure of stock market development [Levine and Zervos (1998)]. Thus,
the data set includes annual variables for 21 OECD countries over the
sample period 1961-1996 with the only exception of market capitalisation
that is available for 16 countries and only over the 1971-1996 period(37).
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( 3 6 ) See De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) for a discussion of the advantages and
shortcomings of different indicators of financial development.
(37) The countries included in the analysis are the following: Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, United
Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden and
USA. MKTCAP is not available for Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and New Zealand.
The data set incorporates four measures of banking system develop-
ment (BTOT, DCPY, QLLY and RESERVES) and one indicator of stock
market development (MKTCAP)(38). The variable labelled QLLY is de-
fined as the ratio of liquid liabilities (excluding currency in circulation and
demand deposits) of the financial system to GDP. We consider this vari-
able, as it is usual in the literature, as a proxy of financial depth since it
represents the size of the formal financial intermediary sector. The implic-
it assumption is that the size of the financial system is positively related to
the provision of financial services. DCPY is defined as the ratio of claims
on the non-financial private sector to GDP. This measure tries to proxy
the amount of credit available to the private sector through the banking
sector. Implicitly we are assuming that the credit granted to the public
sector may respond to different criteria from those used to grant credit to
private agents. BTOT is defined as the ratio of deposit money bank do-
mestic assets to deposit money bank domestic assets plus central bank
domestic assets. It tries to capture the importance of banks relative to the
central bank. The idea behind the use of such variable is that deposit
banks are more likely to provide risk sharing and information services
than central banks. We have also constructed a variable labelled RE-
SERVES, which is defined as the ratio of claims on monetary authorities
to demand deposits plus other deposits of banking institutions. We con-
sider that this variable, even reflecting a policy instrument –the reserve
requirement ratio-, can be also described as a proxy of the degree of fi-
nancial development. The implicit hypothesis here is that countries with
high reserve ratios have less developed financial systems than countries
with low reserve ratios (in particular, Haslag and Koo (1999) have found
evidence in favour of this hypothesis). Finally, we label MKTCAP to the
ratio of domestic shares on domestic exchanges in a year divided by
GDP. It measures the size of the stock market and it is the usual indicator
of market development. This variable captures the fact that the stock
markets provide financial services that are different from those provided
by banks.
Table II.11 presents descriptive statistics on the five financial indica-
tors, growth and inflation. When observations are divided in four quartiles
defined in terms of the growth rate (Panel A) we first observe that con-
temporaneous financial indicators are weakly correlated with growth
rates. Second, as we move from observations with lower growth to obser-
vations with higher growth we see a sizeable decrease in the average in-
flation rate. When observations are divided in four quartiles defined in
terms of the inflation rate (Panel B) we observe that financial indicators
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( 3 8 ) Financial indicators were drawn from the IMF International Financial Statistics
[BTOT, lines (22a + 22d) / (12a + 22a + 22d), DCPY, lines 32d/ 99, QLLY, lines 35/99 and
RESERVES, lines 20/ (24+25)] and Morgan Stanley Capital International (MKTCAP).
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TABLE II.11
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (a)
Output growth. . . –0.5 2.0 3.4 6.0 —
Inflation. . . . . . . . . 7.9 6.7 6.0 5.7 –0.18
DCPY . . . . . . . . . . 62 57 54 48 –0.16
QLLY . . . . . . . . . . . 43 44 40 35 –0.15
BTOT . . . . . . . . . . 92 92 91 91 0.01
RESERVES . . . . . 6.5 7.0 7.0 7.9 0.04
MKTCAP (b) . . . . 29 28 30 31 –0.01
Inflation. . . . . . . . . 1.9 4.1 6.7 13.7 —
Output growth. . . 2.8 3.3 2.9 1.9 –0.18
DCPY . . . . . . . . . . 68 54 54 45 –0.21
QLLY . . . . . . . . . . . 45 39 40 38 –0.05
BTOT . . . . . . . . . . 93 92 93 88 –0.29
RESERVES . . . . . 5.7 6.4 6.5 9.9 0.30
MKTCAP (b) . . . . 44 30 26 17 –0.37
MKTCAP (b) . . . . — 0.57 0.51 0.19 –0.24
QLLY . . . . . . . . . . . — 0.78 0.31 –0.11
DCPY . . . . . . . . . . — 0.52 –0.18
BTOT . . . . . . . . . . — –0.45
RESERVES . . . . . —
PANEL A
AVERAGE LEVEL OF FINANCIAL INDICATORS AND INFLATION
BY SUBSAMPLES DEFINED IN TERMS OF GROWTH
PANEL B
AVERAGE LEVEL OF FINANCIAL INDICATORS AND GROWTH
BY SUBSAMPLES DEFINED IN TERMS OF INFLATION
PANEL C
CONTEMPORANEOUS CORRELATIONS
AMONG FINANCIAL INDICATORS
Very low
Very low
MKTCAP (b)
Low
Low
QLLY
High
High
DCPY
Very high
Very high
BTOT
Correlation
with growth
Correlation
with growth
RESERVES
(a) The whole sample includes 21 countries over the 1961-1993 period.
(b) MKTCAP is only available for 16 countries over the 1971-1993 period.
are negatively, and in some cases significantly, correlated with inflation.
Finally, Panel C shows that financial indicators are highly and significant-
ly correlated with each other. This is specially the case for the measures
of banking development excluding RESERVES. Notice that while vari-
ables QLLY, DCPY and BTOT are aimed to proxy banking development,
the variable RESERVES measures reserve requirements as an indicator
of financial repression and it is negatively correlated with the proxies of fi-
nancial development. For the later variables, the correlation coefficient
among banking indicators ranges between 0.31 and 0.78 in the whole
sample.
To analyse causality relationships among inflation, growth and finan-
cial system developments, we follow a similar approach to that described
in section II.4. Now, we estimate the following unrestricted VAR model:
Yit = Ci + A(L)Yit–1 + B(L)Xit + Uit [II.9]
where Yi t is a vector including the logarithm of per capita GDP, the rate of
inflation (pi t) and a financial variable (Fi t), Ci is a constant (which we allow
to differ among countries) and Ui t is a vector of error terms i.i.d. with con-
stant variance and zero mean. The vector Xi t includes additional regres-
sors usually suggested by growth theory. Details on the causality tests per-
formed in this subsection are more extensively described in section II.4.
The results are presented in Table II.12 and may be summarised as
follows. First, current inflation provides relevant information on output
prospects in OECD countries. The null of non-causality can be rejected in
all cases at the 5 % level of significance. As for the sum of the coeffi-
cients of lagged inflation in the output equation it is always negative and
significant. Moreover, current output developments also help to explain
the future course of the inflation rate. The t-statistic is in this case always
positive and in most cases significant. These effects are robust to alterna-
tive financial variables being included in the VAR and to different lag-
structures. Second, things are different when analysing causality relation-
ships from financial variables to output and the other way round. Causali-
ty from QLLY and RESERVES to output is easily rejected at the 10 %
significance level. The tests of causality from BTOT and DCPY to output
are less conclusive but the t-statistics are hardly significant. Only the vari-
able of market capitalisation helps to forecast future output with a positive
and significant t-statistic. Causality from output to financial variables is
overwhelmingly rejected. Finally, the causality relationships between fi-
nancial variables and inflation are also far from conclusive. On the one
hand, inflation does not help to predict future financial variable dynamics.
This result is in contrast with a recent paper by Boyd, Levine and Smith
(1996) who present evidence in favour of a strong negative association
between inflation and financial market performance. On the other hand,
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TABLE II.12
CAUSALITY RESULTS
3 0 –3.52 51 –0.91 0 2.16 68 0.94 6 1.23 11 –0.70
5 0 –2.56 64 –0.60 0 4.08 62 0.66 2 –0.59 5 0.51
3 0 –4.28 4 –1.57 0 2.10 15 0.23 62 0.72 3 1.13
5 0 –4.12 8 –0.43 0 3.89 15 –1.25 66 0.25 3 0.76
3 0 –4.34 33 –0.81 0 2.32 1 0.01 2 –1.02 1 1.94
5 0 –3.45 46 0.07 0 4.05 2 –0.80 12 –1.01 7 0.51
3 0 –3.87 13 0.68 0 1.90 46 –0.90 55 –1.26 46 1.02
5 0 –3.39 32 0.90 0 3.92 12 –2.24 70 –0.37 47 0.70
3 0 –3.22 23 –1.36 7 0.85 1 –2.55 0 2.37 8 –0.55
5 0 –3.70 43 –1.05 3 2.47 5 –1.06 0 1.90 10 0.11
PANEL A
Causality from inflation to
Output
F (%) t F (%) t F (%) t F (%) t F (%) t F (%) t
BTOTp Inflation BTOT Output Inflation
Causality from output to Causality from BTOT to
PANEL B
Causality from inflation to
Output
F (%) t F (%) t F (%) t F (%) t F (%) t F (%) t
QLLYp Inflation QLLY Output Inflation
Causality from output to Causality from QLLY to
Notes: The model includes individual effects, accumulation rates (investment rate –lagged 1 period–,
schooling, rate of growth of population and a trend) and some macroeconomic indicators lagged 1 period
(money growth, exports growth and public spending as a percentage of GDP). F (%) indicates the p-val-
ue of the F exclusion test described in the text. t indicates the t-statistc for the sum of the coefficients of
the logs of the variable of interest. p indicates the number of lags of the model.
PANEL C
Causality from inflation to
Output
F (%) t F (%) t F (%) t F (%) t F (%) t F (%) t
DCPYp Inflation DCPY Output Inflation
Causality from output to Causality from DCPY to
PANEL D
Causality from inflation to
Output
F (%) t F (%) t F (%) t F (%) t F (%) t F (%) t
RESERVESp Inflation RESERVES Output Inflation
Causality from output to Causality from RESERVES to
PANEL E
Causality from inflation to
Output
F (%) t F (%) t F (%) t F (%) t F (%) t F (%) t
MKTCAPp Inflation MKTCAP Output Inflation
Causality from output to Causality from MKTCAP t o
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two out of the five financial variables considered help (at least for some
lag-structures) to predict future inflation. However, this result is not very
robust to the lag structure. Moreover, the sum of the coefficients of past
financial variables in the inflation equation differs also considerably
across models: it is positive, and in some cases significant, for QLLY,
DCPY and RESERVES and it changes signs for the different models in-
cluding BTOT and MKTCAP. These results give weak support to the link
among finance development and growth, whereas they confirm that run-
ning from inflation to growth. Moreover, the causality results are not in
favour of the close relationship between inflation and financial develop-
ment suggested by the models stressing financial market frictions(39).
II.5.3. Results
We turn our attention to more standard convergence equations, suit-
ably augmented to include both the inflation rate as well as some indica-
tors of financial development. We take as a benchmark the linear ver-
sions of the convergence equations estimated in section II.2 making use
of four-year averages of the raw annual data (expressed in logs) covering
the period 1961-1996. More precisely, in this specification the growth rate
of per capita income is regressed on the initial level of per capita income,
the rate of investment, the rate of schooling, the growth rate of popula-
tion, a linear trend and a constant. In order to test the effects of interest,
we augment these equations with the inflation rate and with some indica-
tors of financial development.
Table II.13 shows the OLS estimates of the convergence equation
augmented with inflation and/or financial system indicators. To save
space, we only present the coefficient estimates for inflation and financial
development indicators. The coefficients of the other explanatory vari-
ables are not significantly different from those obtained in column (2) of
Table II.2. Regarding the effects of interest, the coefficient of the inflation
rate is negative and significant when excluding financial system indica-
tors. The size of the coefficient does not change significantly when these
indicators are included. The coefficients of the proxies of financial devel-
opment have the expected sign, but only BTOT and RESERVES are sig-
nificant at the 5 % level of significance (MKTCAP is so at 10 %). This ev-
idence is not fully consistent with the standard results obtained in cross-
section regressions with larger samples of countries [see, for instance,
(39) As an alternative to the OLS with country dummies procedure used, we also tried
the strategy followed by Rousseau and Wachtel (1998). This strategy consists in estimating
equation [II.9] in first differences by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Using this
procedure yields a much lower the level of significance of the causality tests.
King and Levine (1993a)]. When inflation is included among the right-
hand side variables two results are worth noting. First, the coefficients of
the financial development indicators keep their sign although none of
them is significant at the 5 % level(40); second, the coefficient of inflation
is always negative and significant and is not dramatically affected by the
presence of either QLLY, BTOT, DCPY or RESERVES in the model(41).
Overall, these results indicate, first, that it seems to be a genuine ef-
fect of inflation on growth and, second, that the development of the finan-
cial system could favour economic growth. Both effects are apparently
not related, although, if any, the former seems to be stronger. However,
before to draw any conclusion out of these estimates it is convenient to
take a closer look at these relationships, trying to correct for some biases
that might arise in these specifications. In particular, we address two of
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TABLE II.13
CONVERGENCE EQUATION WITH INFLATION AND FINANCIAL INDICATORS (OLS)
Inflation. . . . .— — — — — –0.0044 –0.0041 –0.0043 –0.0040 –0.0032
..................... (5.58) (5.01) (5.46) (4.93) (1.97)
QLLY . . . . . . 0.003 — — — — 0.005 — — — —
.....................(0.13) (0.25)
BTOT . . . . . .— 0.123 — — — — 0.046 — — —
..................... (2.52) (0.94)
DCPY . . . . . .— — 0.018 — — — — 0.005 — —
..................... (1.17) (0.37)
R E S E R V E S . — — — –0.191 — — — — –0.103 —
..................... (2.97) (1.63)
MKTCAP . . . — — — — 0.035 — — — — 0.031
..................... (1.94) (1.74)
R2 . . . . . . . . . 0.50 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.32 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.35
s . . . . . . . . . . 0.051 0.050 0.051 0.050 0.039 0.048 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.039
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Notes: (i) Estimation method: OLS. Absolute t-ratios in parentheses. (ii) Other explanatory variables included in the re-
gressions: initial level of per capita income, rate of investment, rate of schooling, growth rate of population, a linear trend
and a constant. (iii) The p-value for the F-test of the joint exclusion of QLLY, BTOT, DCPY and RESERVES is 0.02 (0.59)
in an equation excluding (including) the inflation rate. The p-value for the F-test of the joint exclusion of QLLY, BTOT,
DCPY, RESERVES and MKTCAP is 0.01 (0.00) in an equation excluding (including) the inflation rate.
(40) When the financial development indicators are simultaneously included their sig-
nificance is jointly rejected. The p-value for the F-test of the joint exclusion of QLLY, BTOT,
DCPY and RESERVES is 0.06 (0.51) in an equation excluding (including) the inflation rate.
The p-value for the F-test of the joint exclusion of QLLY, BTOT, DCPY, RESERVES and
MKTCAP is 0.19 (0.12) in an equation excluding (including) the inflation rate.
(41) The fall in the coefficient of inflation in column (10) has more to do with the re-
duced sample in this equation than with the presence of MKTCAP on it.
the most common criticisms to the empirical framework adopted: country-
specific time invariant effects and simultaneity biases(42). In order to
deal with these two sources of potential biases, we augment the empirical
model to allow for cross-country heterogeneity and we estimate by instru-
mental variables to take into account the simultaneity among the consid-
ered variables.
Table II.14 presents the results of the IV estimates of models with
country-specific effects. Again, to save space, we only present the coeffi-
cient estimates for inflation and financial development indicators. Com-
paring results in Tables II.13 and II.14 (OLS without country-specific ef-
fects and IV with country-specific effects) some interesting results
arise(43). First, the coefficient of inflation is negative and significant and
its size is significantly larger than that obtained in the OLS estimation.
This result is consistent with the causality tests in which a positive causal-
ity running from income to inflation was detected, thus leading to a simul-
taneity downward bias in the OLS estimation of the inflation costs. Again,
the inflation rate stands as the only additional regression in the conver-
gence equation, which keeps a reasonable explanatory power of growth
rates in OECD economies(44). Second, in the IV estimation the coeffi-
cients of financial development proxies are not significant; only BTOT is
close to the 10 % level of significance when inflation is not included in the
specification (column 2 of Table II.14)(45 . This might imply that the ob-
served positive effect of financial development on growth could be at-
tributed, in our sample, to reverse causation (from growth to financial de-
velopment). This would suggest that, for our sample of industrialised
economies, the interaction of inflation with financial market variables is
not a relevant mechanism to explain the effects of inflation on long-run
growth. This result is consistent with that of De Gregorio and Guidotti
(1995). These authors show that the positive correlation between finan-
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(42) As discussed by Harris (1997) the standard procedure of choosing the initial val-
ue of a variable as the instrument of its value throughout the period may lead to misleading
results. In particular, in the context of financial and growth models, it can overstate the sta-
tistical significance of financial indicators. To avoid this, Harris proposes to run 2SLS using
lagged values as instruments for the endogenous ones.
( 4 3 ) Andrés, Hernando and López-Salido (1999) present both OLS estimates with
country dummies and IV estimates without these country-specific effects for a slightly short-
er sample period. In both types of models, the coefficients of the indicators of financial de-
velopment become non-significant and the coefficient of the inflation rate remains negative
and significant. The OLS estimate of the coefficient of the inflation rate is smaller when in-
cluding country-dummies. On the other hand, the IV estimate of the coefficient of the infla-
tion rate in the model without country-dummies is larger than the OLS estimate.
(44) In column (10) the t-ratio of the inflation rate is 1.50. Nevertheless, this low value
is not only caused by the presence of MKTCAP in the regression, but also by the short sam-
ple used to estimate this model (16 countries and a shorter period, further reduced by the
use of instruments).
(45) In Table II.14, when the financial development proxies are simultaneously includ-
ed they are jointly rejected at the 10 per cent level.
cial indicators and growth is considerably weaker for industrialised coun-
tries, suggesting that the positive effect of financial development is espe-
cially relevant in the early stages of the development process. These re-
sults are also consistent with those of Harris (1997) who finds only a
weak significance of stock markets indicators in growth regressions for
developed countries (MKTCAP in our model).
Summing up, our analysis shows that the negative effect of inflation in
growth equations remains significant even after including financial market
variables. Additionally, the link between proxies of financial market perfor-
mance and growth is found to be weak, vanishing when country-dummies
are included and endogeneity is accounted for using instrumental variables.
Also, controlling for inflation reduces the significance of those indicators.
Overall, these results indicate, first, that the long-run costs of inflation are
genuine and not explained by a sort of omitted variable bias. These costs
are not explained by policies of financial repression and although they may
stem from the interconnection among inflation and financial market condi-
tions, this is not the only (nor the most important) channel.
In addition, our analysis has not found a significant positive growth-fi-
nancial development link. There are three potential reasons for the lack of
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TABLE II.14
CONVERGENCE EQUATION WITH INFLATION AND FINANCIAL INDICATORS
(IV WITH COUNTRY EFFECTS)
Inflation. . . . . — — — — — –0.0076 –0.0086 –0.0075 –0.0078 –0.0064
..................... (4.10) (3.76) (4.17) (3.76) (1.50)
QLLY. . . . . . .–0.047 — — — — –0.016 — — — —
.....................(0.87) (0.34)
BTOT . . . . . .— 0.192 — — — — –0.086 — — —
..................... (1.74) (0.70)
DCPY . . . . . . — — 0.023 — — — — –0.009 — —
..................... (0.71) (0.32)
R E S E R V E S . — — — –0.222 — — — — –0.024 —
..................... (1.53) (0.18)
MKTCAP . . . — — — — –0.072 — — — — –0.035
..................... (0.87) (0.49)
R2 . . . . . . . . . 0.41 0.46 0.41 0.45 0.15 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.46
s . . . . . . . . . . 0.056 0.054 0.056 0.054 0.051 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.041
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Notes: (i) Estimation method: IV. Instruments: constant, country dummies and first and second order lags of the regres-
sors and second lag of the dependent variable. Absolute t-ratios in parentheses. (ii) Other explanatory variables included in
the regressions: initial level of per capita income, rate of investment, rate of schooling, growth rate of population, country
dummies and a constant. (iii) The p-value for the F-test of the joint exclusion of QLLY, BTOT, DCPY and RESERVES is
0.20 (0.66) in an equation excluding (including) the inflation rate. The p-value for the F-test of the joint exclusion of QLLY,
BTOT, DCPY, RESERVES and MKTCAP is 0.16 (0.37) in an equation excluding (including) the inflation rate.
significance of this relationship in our analysis. First, the finance-growth
link might be less relevant for industrialised countries with already highly
developed financial systems. Second, the standard analysis of the fi-
nance-growth link does not correct the specification biases that might
arise when cross-country heterogeneity and simultaneity among the con-
sidered variables are not taken into account. Finally, the proxies for finan-
cial development used in our analysis –which are the standard indicators
in the empirical literature- might be adequate when analysing large sam-
ples of countries, but might be too rough when focussing in a smaller and
more homogeneous sample of countries, like our panel of OECD coun-
tries. In particular, we believe that the impact of financial markets on eco-
nomic growth is more sophisticated than what these standard variables
capture. On the one hand, these standard indicators do not cover all the
agents or institutions that provide financial services. On the other hand,
these indicators are mainly measuring the size of the institution or market
without properly capturing the efficiency of the financial system. In our
view, the construction of indicators of the efficiency of the financial sys-
tem and the analysis of its impact on the process of economic growth are
issues that deserve further research.
II.6. Concluding remarks
In this chapter we have tried to assess the long-run costs of inflation,
within an explicit theoretical framework stemming from the growth litera-
ture: the convergence equation. Despite its shortcomings, this approach
is well suited to test the robustness of the correlation between growth and
inflation in low inflation economies with reasonably well working markets,
such as the OECD countries during the 1960-1996 period. The specific
results are described at length in each section and will not be repeated
here. The main finding is that current inflation is not positively correlated
with income per capita over the long run.
In fact, in most specifications tried we obtained a significant negative
correlation between inflation and income growth during rather long peri-
ods. This negative correlation survives the presence of additional regres-
sors, such as the investment rate, population growth and schooling rates,
and the imposition of the theoretical restrictions implied by the constant
returns of technology. Moreover, our analysis shows that the negative ef-
fect of inflation in growth equations remains significant even after includ-
ing financial market variables. This result suggests that the long-run costs
of inflation are not explained by policies of financial repression and al-
though they may stem from the interconnection among inflation and fi-
nancial market conditions, this is not the only (nor the most important)
channel.
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What is most remarkable is that the negative coefficient of inflation in
growth equations remains significant even after allowing for country-spe-
cific time-invariant effects in the equations. This is striking since, as it is
well known in the empirical growth literature, few regressors in conver-
gence equations withstand the explanatory power of country dummies.
The analysis of causality gives less clear-cut results, but it is also note-
worthy that causality from inflation to growth is always significant and
never positive. Again, this result shows up more clearly whenever the in-
fluence of country dummies, accumulation rates and the effect of other
macroeconomic variables is controlled for.
Inflation not only reduces the level of investment but also the efficien-
cy with which productive factors are used. It has a negative temporary im-
pact upon long-term growth rates, which, in turn, generates a permanent
fall of income per capita. Our results suggest that the marginal cost of in-
flation diminishes as the inflation rate becomes higher. The estimated
benefit of a permanent reduction of inflation by one percentage point de-
pends on the starting level of inflation. Thus, reducing the inflation rate
from (say) 20 % to 19 % may increase output by 0.5 % in the long-run.
This benefit increases with further reductions in inflation and might be
twice as large when inflation reaches a low 5 %. These benefits seem to
be lower than others reported in the literature, but some evidence sug-
gests that they might be underestimated since there is a positive causa-
tion running from growth to inflation, in particular for economies with fixed
exchange rates. It must also be noticed that these estimates are obtained
in models displaying a high convergence rate, so that the present value
of the benefits of disinflation might be quite sizeable. Overall, these re-
sults indicate that the long-run costs of inflation are non-negligible and
that efforts to keep inflation under control will sooner or later pay off in
terms of better long-run performance and higher per capita income.
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III
THE DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF PERMANENT DISINFLATIONS
In the previous chapter we presented evidence that shed some light
on the effects of inflation on per capita income in the context of conver-
gence regressions. Instrumental variable estimates, fixed effects models
and Granger causality tests suggest that the estimated correlation can be
interpreted as a genuine harmful effect of inflation on income which indi-
cates that the way monetary policy is conducted has permanent real ef-
fects. Unfortunately, the econometric methods used there do not fully set-
tle the issue of causality among the two variables involved. Since inflation
and output are endogenous variables their joint evolution might reflect
non-monetary shocks, for instance technology shocks, affecting both vari-
ables. That is, the sign of that correlation may be negative because high
growth tends to generate low inflation as a result of (exogenous) techno-
logical progress [see, for instance, Kocherlakota (1996) and Sims
(1996)]. This chapter approaches this issue using an alternative econo-
metric approach.
The dynamic relationship among inflation and growth is further com-
plicated by the fact that the sign and size of the correlation among these
two variables is likely to differ sharply depending on whether a short-run
or a long-run perspective is adopted. Most of the business cycle literature
explains a positive correlation among inflation and output on the grounds
of nominal price or wage rigidities, relative price misperceptions, credit ra-
tioning and the like. Thus, monetary policy actions, undertaken with the
aim of reducing the inflation rate, are likely to result in significant short-
run increases in unemployment and output losses. The combination of
continuous market clearing and rational expectations in macroeconomic
models reduces the significance of the trade-off between inflation and un-
employment to the very short-run. But, the performance of the labour
market may play a special role relating business cycle fluctuations with
long-run growth.
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In this chapter we undertake a joint analysis of both the short and
long-run real effects of disinflationary processes. Our approach is mostly
empirical although the restrictions invoked to identify alternative sources
of fluctuations can be justified on the basis of a fairly general macroeco-
nomic model. We do so for two reasons. First, because it is not easy to
portray all these long-run and short-run features in a simple dynamic
macroeconomic model which captures what we consider the most salient
feature of a process of disinflation: the changing pattern from the short-
run negative correlation between inflation and unemployment to the long-
run negative one between inflation and output. Second, because even if
one succeeds in constructing a general equilibrium model displaying such
a pattern, it would hardly account for more than a few out the many chan-
nels through which inflation is related to unemployment and output(1).
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. SectionIII.1 describes
the endogeneity problem, introducing the Structural Vector Autoregres-
sion (SVAR) literature as a suitable device to deal with the problem. In
sectionIII.2 we introduce the role of unemployment in order to describe
alternative identifying restrictions, which allow us to assess costs and
benefits of disinflation at different horizons. In sectionIII.3 we present the
empirical results for Spain. These results are also extended to several
major OECD countries in sectionIII.4. Finally, sectionIII.5 summarises
the main results of the analysis.
III.1. The analysis of the long-run effects of disinflation:
a SVAR approach
No matter how elaborated they might be, cross-country convergence
regressions do not fully settle the issue of endogeneity in the correlation
among inflation and growth(2). This issue is of crucial importance to as-
sess the beneficial effects of sound monetary policies. The argument goes
as follows. Let us assume that output and inflation are non stationary vari-
ables whose unit roots can be explained by J orthogonal shocks {«j} ,
pt =p[b1(L)«
1, b2(L)«
2, b3(L)«
3 ,...]
yt =y[d1(L)«
1, d2(L)«
2, d3(L)«
3 ,...]
if «1 represents money growth, the estimated long-run correlation among
inflation and income is relevant for the monetary authority if it is the inap-
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(1) In particular, the hysteresis-like mechanisms could explain the dependence of the
long-run growth from the short-run movements in activity [see Blanchard and Summers
(1986)].
(2) See Kocherlakota (1996) and Sims (1996), among others.
propriate control of money growth what is causing today inflation and to-
morrow’s output losses. In terms of the previous equations this requires
that;
Corr [p(b1(1)«
1), g(d1(1)«
1)] , 0
where b(1) and d(1) represent the long-run multipliers of the lagged poly-
nomials d(L) and b(L) respectively. But for this correlation to be negative it
is a necessary condition that d1(1) is strictly different from zero or, in other
words, that money has a genuine negative influence on output. Critics of
the results obtained estimating inflation augmented convergence equations
argue that the negative correlation estimated in convergence equations
might be driven by other, non-monetary, shock(s), thus rendering it use-
less for monetary policy purposes. Thus, since all shocks are exogenous,
the right approach to deal with the risk of causality is to estimate the ulti-
mate source of fluctuations (i.e. the «’s) and to test the sign of d1(1 ) .
When the issue of causality is thought of as running from shocks to
variables rather than from one variable to another variables, VAR models
are the most appropriate framework. For one thing, in a VAR all variables
involved are endogenous thus avoiding the flaws of many empirical mod-
els relating inflation with output growth that do not deal properly with the
problems raised by the endogeneity of inflation. Moreover, the analysis of
the relationship between inflation and growth is often blamed by not dis-
criminating among different types of shocks behind inflation. The SVAR
methodology makes it possible to identify different structural shocks driv-
ing the variables during the sample period and thus, to focus on the cor-
relation among monetary policy shocks and output, which is our primary
interest. Last but no least, since the theoretical foundations of empirical
models relating inflation and growth is often weak, it is necessary to be
careful as to which theoretical restrictions are imposed on the data; the
SVAR methodology has the advantage of making explicit the identifying
assumptions.
Bullard and Keating (1995) were among the first to approach the
long-run effect of inflation in this way. They assume that the J set can be
split in two groups: those shocks which exert a permanent effect on infla-
tion («P) and those with a purely temporary effect on it («T). Thus the long-
run representation of the {p, y} process is:
Dpt =g11(1)«
P
t
Dyt =g21(1)«
P
t +g22(1)«
T
t
(where gij(1) represent the long-run multipliers of the dynamic model). To
obtain an estimate of the «‘s, Bullard and Keating invoke an e x t r e m e
monetarist assumption, namely that inflation is always and everywhere a
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monetary phenomenon. Under this assumption, «P can be identified as
the only shock behind the unit root of inflation directly linked to the rate of
growth of the monetary base, without contamination from supply side dis-
turbances, to be found in «T. Thus, the interpretation of the estimated
long run correlation among inflation and income boils down to a test of
the sign of g21(1). Bullard and Keating apply their model to several coun-
tries and find that the sign of g21(1) is positive in most cases and signifi-
cant in some of them, meaning that inflation is costless over the long run.
If disinflations, as it is broadly accepted, are costly in the short-run, the
case for price stability is undermined. Thus, while cross-country regres-
sions come up with a negative relationship between inflation and output,
the SVAR approach, aimed at eliminating supply side influences on infla-
tion, yields opposite results.
Nevertheless, the model identified under the extr me monetarist
assumption might still yield a biased estimate of the long-run output effect
of the monetary shock. To see how this may happen let us assume that
permanent inflation has a real component (say «2), so that the true long-
run VAR model is:
Dp =b1(1)«
1 +b2(1)«
2
Dy =d1(1)«
1 +d2(1)«
2 +d3(1)«
3 +d4(1)«
4 +...
Under this assumption it is clear that the estimated «P in the monetarist
model would not be an adequate estimate of «1 and «2 (whose effect may
even go in opposite directions). For this to happen, it does not matter how
small the contribution of «2 to the long-run fluctuations of p is. As long as
it is significant, what really matters is the size of d2(1); if this multiplier is
positive and large, an estimated positive g21(1) might be compatible with
a negative influence of monetary shocks on output [i.e. a negative d1(1)].
Unfortunately, the additional source of long-run inflation cannot be identi-
fied in the bivariate system if we want to make use of long-run identifica-
tion restrictions.
III.2. Inflation, output and unemployment
III.2.1. The model
To identify additional (non-nominal) sources of fluctuations of infla-
tion, thus isolating the true nominal component, we need to enlarge previ-
ous analysis with a third variable. Unemployment turns out to be a good
candidate for such purpose and, thus, the model is specified as a station-
ary vector in the first differences of unemployment (u), inflation (p) and
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the log of output (y). This system will be driven by three orthogonal
shocks: «N containing the nominal source of fluctuations and «Z, «* which
are real and, that for reasons explained below, are called productivity and
natural rate-velocity shocks, respectively.
There are a number of advantages in enlarging the SVAR models
with the unemployment rate. First, unemployment has been over the last
two decades very much a non-stationary variable that it is bound to con-
tain useful information about the long-run features of the economies in
our sample(3). Second, most macroeconomic models come up with
clear-cut predictions about the long-run determinants of unemployment
(NAIRU), thus providing structural restrictions for identification purposes.
Finally, but not least, a joint consideration of output and unemployment
seems the natural approach to the costs of inflation since the SVAR
approach permits a clear distinction between short-run and long-run
responses to particular shocks. Any process of disinflation is expected to
impinge upon the economy some costs and to yield some benefits. The
expected time pattern of these is one in which costs, in terms of higher
unemployment and output foregone, come first whereas the eventual
beneficial effects take much longer to show up. The presence of such
pattern in the dynamics of our model might be taken as some sort of in-
formal overidentifying restrictions.
The structural innovations might be compounded of a larger set of in-
novations, so they are loosely defined. However, what is crucial for our
purposes is the ability of the model to isolate the nominal shock, whose
long-run real effect is what we are interested in. Since the structural inno-
vations are by definition orthogonal, purely nominal shocks (i.e. shocks to
monetary growth) may pertain to any of the three «’s but only to one of
them. Thus, a more precise definition of «Z and «* is not necessary, as
long as the identifying restrictions provide an unbiased estimate of the
nominal shock behind inflation. The structural model in matrix form can
be represented as:
[III.1]
where ci j(1) represents the long-run multiplier of the jt h shock on the it h
variable. In order to identify the shocks we impose some restrictions de-
Dp
D y
D u
 = 
c11(1) c12(1) c13(1)
c21(1) c22(1) c23(1)
c31(1) c32(1) c33(1)
 
e N
e Z
e *
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(3) See, for instance, King and Watson (1994), Alogouskofis and Manning (1988) and
Hall (1999).
rived from the long run implications of a large class of macroeconomic
models that can be cast in terms of the following simple framework:
p =Dm + Dn – Dy [III.2]
yt = at +akt + (1– a)l
s
t – (1 – a)ut [III.3]
DyPt =t1(L)«*t +t2(L)«
N
t +t3(L)«
Z
t [III.4]
ut = u*t – b(pt – p
e
t) + «
Z
t [III.5]
Du*t =d1(L)«*t +d2(L)«
N
t +d3(L)«
Z
t [III.6]
The inflation process is represented in [III.2] by a simple quantitative the-
ory equation, where m and are logs of money supply and velocity re-
spectively. Notice that we are allowing the monetary authority to respond
in a systematic way to real shocks. This process is motivated by mone-
tary rules aimed at smoothing inflation and output(4). Expressions [III.3]
and [III.4] represent the determinants of current output, derived from a
constant returns to scale production function, and potential (yp) output; a,
k and ls represent the total factor productivity, the capital stock and the
labour supply respectively. Equation [III.5] is a standard Phillips curve, in
which deviations of unemployment from its natural level (u*) depend on
temporary nominal and real shocks. Finally, expression [III.6] represents
the process of u* as a function of the structural shocks.
The process of inflation can also be written as an unrestricted func-
tion of the structural innovations as,
Dpt = c11(L)«
N
t + c12(L)«
Z
t + c13(L)«*t [III.7]
and taking first differences in [III.5],
Dut =Du*t – b[c11(0)(«
N
t – «
N
t–1) + (c12(0) + 1)(«
Z
t – «
Z
t–1) + c13(0)(«*t – «*t–1)] [III.8]
where cij(0) are the associated short-run multipliers of the cij(L) polynomi-
al lag matrices. Similarly, the output process (Okun’s Law) can be written
as follows:
Dyt =Dy
P
t – (1 – a) (Dut – Du*t) [III.9]
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(4) See, among others, Galí (1999) and Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000).
III.2.2. Alternative Identifying Restrictions
Inflation is a monetary phenomenon
From equation [III.8] we see that the effect of any shock on unem-
ployment is purely transitory, unless it affects the natural rate u* directly.
Most theories of the natural rate predict that nominal shocks do not have
a permanent effect on unemployment. Similarly, according to these theo-
ries the effect of productivity shocks on the supply and the demand for
labour cancel out in the long run, so that these shocks have no effect
upon u* either(5). If we identify «Z as those real shocks with no perma-
nent effect on u*, the process [III.6] incorporates the following long-run re-
strictions: d2(1) = d3(1) = 0. Thus, the structural long-run multipliers c31(1)
and c32(1) are both set to zero.
The process of yP is not restricted. According to equation [III.9] the
sources of long-run output fluctuations are those of potential output, i.e.
those behind permanent changes in the savings rate, population growth
and the total factor productivity. These variables are jointly driven by all
shocks: «Z, «N and «*. The effect of purely nominal shocks on potential
output is questionable; however we allow for such an effect in the model
since the significance and sign of such effect is the main hypothesis we
are interested in(6).
The remaining long-run restrictions must be found in the determinants
of the unit root of inflation. First, the monetarist assumption of inflation be-
ing a monetary phenomenon in the long run, implies that the unit root of
inflation is just money growth providing two restrictions in the matrix of
long run multipliers: c12(1) = c13(1) = 0 [see Roberts (1993) for a similar
strategy]. This set of assumptions provides four identifying restrictions
and, consequently, the model is overidentified(7). The data does not
support this scheme and the overidentification restrictions are clearly re-
jected; thus, in order to reconcile the model with the facts, we can consid-
er two alternative sets of identification schemes(8).
Retaining the monetarist assumption but allowing for a long-run nega-
tively sloped Phillips curve (i.e. removing c3 1(1) = 0), the nominal shock is
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(5) This has been established by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) as a consistent
empirical feature of modern economies and it has been recently stressed by Blanchard and
Katz (1997).
(6) Notice that both «z and «* are real determinants of output, the difference among
them being that the former does not exert a permanent influence upon unemployment.
(7) The econometrics of SVAR is devoted to AppendixIII.1.
(8) With data for the Spanish economy, the statistic (x2(1)=23.67) is not significant at
the 5%. TableIII.3 shows this statistic for the cases of other OECD countries.
the only responsible of the common trend between inflation and unemploy-
ment. This identifying scheme may be labelled as monetarist-full hysteresis,
meaning that part of the observed upward trend of unemployment might
have a nominal origin. However, full hysteresis is helpless in our framework,
since it relies on models which explain that any temporary shock might have
permanent effects on unemployment and in such a case, c3 2(1) = 0 would
not be a feasible restriction, thus rendering the model underidentified( 9 ) .
Real shocks behind inflation
Alternatively, we can keep the assumption of a long-run vertical Phillips
curve but considering the possibility of more than one shock driving the
process of inflation in the long-run (i.e. removing either c1 2(1) = 0 or c1 3(1) =
0 or both). In such a case, the low frequency relationship between inflation
and unemployment is due to real shocks, but this raises the issue of how a
non-monetary source of long-run inflation can be rationalised. Although dif-
ferences in money growth must account for most of the cross-country
differences in inflation, many authors argue that the influence of other, non-
monetary, factors cannot be denied. A strand of the literature of internation-
al trade suggests that relative inflation is partially explained by structural dif-
ferences both on the demand and on the supply side of the economy( 1 0 ) .
The argument relies in the different pricing behaviour of firms in sectors ex-
posed to the international competition as compared with that of firms spe-
cialised in the production of nontradable goods. If productivity in the trad-
ables sector grows faster than that in the nontradables, the productivity
gain leads to higher wages and labour demand. This in turn produces an
across-the-board increase in wages that is translated into higher prices in
those sectors with monopolistic power and slow productivity growth. Similar
effects can result from increases in public spending(11). An alternative ap-
proach is represented by Ball and Mankiw (1995) who show that if the dis-
tribution of relative prices present skewness, due to menu costs, real
shocks may have an effect upon the general price level. What these theo-
ries of inflation have in common is that shocks which do not have a mone-
tary origin might exert a lasting influence on the inflation rate( 1 2) .
More formally, the existence of a non-monetary source of inflation
may be also rationalised making use of equation [III.2]. In this general
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(9) Furthermore, the theoretical conditions under which full hsyteresis takes place are
very demanding [Blanchard (1997)]. Dolado and López-Salido (1996) use real wages in-
stead of inflation to test the importance of full-hysteresis in the Spanish economy.
( 1 0 ) See, among others, Balassa (1964), Samuelson (1964) or, more recently, De
Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1994) and Campillo and Miron (1997).
(11) See Rogoff (1992) and Martín Moreno (1996).
( 1 2 ) Balke and Wynne (1996) show how inflation may occur even without money
growth, merely as a consequence of real shocks.
set-up, since velocity is usually taken as a residual, the non-monetary
shock might be considered as a shock to this component that, while af-
fecting inflation permanently does lead neither to a long-run shift in the
growth rate of the economy nor to changes on money growth. More pre-
cisely, the shocks considered by most real theories of inflation operate
through stochastic movements in this residual, thus exerting a long-last-
ing influence on inflation and on the level of output.
Many economists would argue that over and above these real shocks,
persistent inflation requires monetary accommodation; if this is so, all mod-
els are monetarist and there is not a relevant distinction among real and
monetarist theories of inflation in the very long run(13). Despite this ambi-
guity, there are reasons to allow for more than one source of long-run infla-
tion movements (i.e. to remove either c1 2(1) = 0 or c1 3( 1 )=0). First, from an
econometric perspective, the time horizon at which money can be consid-
ered fully accommodated, and thus the only source of inflation, may be very
long. If this is the case, extreme monetarism is an infinite horizon property
and, as argued by Faust and Leeper (1997), it may be wise not imposing it
as a long run restriction at finite horizons. Second, although allowing for
more than one source of inflation is controversial, since it is by no means
easy to give a precise interpretation to all of them, the orthogonality of
shocks ensures that only one of these contains the nominal component (i.e.
monetary growth), the one whose effect we are interested in. Third, remov-
ing this restriction makes the model less restricted so we have the chance of
testing whether inflation has had a substantial non-monetary component.
There are different identification schemes in which inflation is allowed
to be influenced by real shocks also over the long run, all of which are
characterised by either c13(1) or c12(1) not being zero. The assumption of
productivity shocks not having permanent effect on inflation is widely ac-
cepted, whereas most theories of the natural rate suggest that some sup-
ply shocks may result in higher unemployment and higher permanent in-
flation, which may be captured by allowing c1 3(1) to be different from
zero. Thus, our preferred empirical model is identified under the restric-
tions: c31(1)=c32(1)=c12(1)=0 (14).
III.3. The disinflation in Spain: 1976-1996
The Spanish economy is characterised by a medium-high, but steadi-
ly subsiding, inflation over the sample period (1976 to 1996), as well as
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(13) See, for instance, Ball (1993) for a discussion of this issue.
(14) The alternative identification scheme (c31(1)=c32(1)=c13(1)=0) has the undesirable
property of not allowing for a common long-term component of inflation and unemployment
and will not be tried here.
by a very high and persistent aggregate unemployment. The growth rate
has also suffered large fluctuations during this period. These features
make of the Spanish macroeconomic performance a most adequate case
study to analyse the dynamic interactions of the three variables of inter-
est. As it was mentioned before, the overidentified model is clearly reject-
ed so we go straight to discuss the results obtained under our preferred
identification scheme that are summarised in Figure III.1 and
TableIII.1(15).
The innovation «Z is well identified as a supply shock, with a short run
influence on unemployment. Its short run effect on inflation is, as expect-
ed, countercyclical and it does not contribute to the forecast variance de-
composition of inflation at any time horizon. The contribution of this type
of innovation to explain the unit root of output is low (from 27% in the
short-run to 9 % in the long-run) as compared with the contribution of «*,
which looks very much as a real demand shock, since it is associated
with a permanent fall in inflation and in output. This is less surprising than
it looks since «Z does not include all real shocks, but only those that do
not exert a permanent influence upon inflation. This feature may reflect
the importance of unemployment persistence in Spain in shaping the
course of output and the fact that the restriction of demand shocks having
no effect on long run output is difficult to maintain(16).
The assumption of two shocks driving inflation seems well accepted
by the data. As can be seen from TableIII.1, positive one-period im-
pulses to «N and «* produce permanent changes in inflation. Even as-
suming that there are several forces of long-run inflation, to what extent
does our identification scheme succeeds in allocating nominal and real
components to «N and «* respectively? We interpret «* as an inflation
shock that has a real component with permanent effects upon the natu-
ral rate of unemployment, whereas «N can be interpreted as a nominal
shock. Notice that «* explains most of unemployment and a great deal
of output too, which makes it hard to consider it a nominal shock. On
the other hand «N behaves as a nominal demand shock. It is demand
since the short-run correlation with unemployment displays a Phillips
curve pattern: the increase in inflation leads to a rapid, although not
very pronounced, fall in unemployment in the short run. As inflation
reaches its steady-state level, unemployment subsides slowly returning
to its previous level in about 20 quarters. Other features indicate that «N
must collect the nominal determinants of inflation. First, although our
identification scheme allows for non-monetary determinants of inflation,
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( 1 5 ) In FiguresIII.1 to III.4, thin lines depict approximate 90% confidence intervals
computed using 1000 bootstrap replications using the method proposed by Runkle (1987).
(16) See, for instance, Dolado and López-Salido (1996 and 2000) and Andrés, Mestre
and Vallés (1999).
money is still expected to be the most important one, and «N  c c o u n t s
for most of the variance of the forecast error of inflation over the long
run (77%). Second, although the long run impact of both inflation
shocks upon output is left free, the contribution of «N t  the forecast
variance decomposition of output is virtually nil (below 1 %).
Turning now to our main hypothesis of interest, we find that the re-
sponse of output to impulses in «N is negative and strongly significant,
especially in the long run. Thus, conditioned on our characterisation of
«N being adequate, we have identified an effect of inflation on long term
income, which is of the same sign to that found in the literature of
growth. It is true that the other shock driving inflation («*) displays a pos-
itive correlation with income, but this by no means, contradicts the claim
that disinflation with a monetary origin generates beneficial effects in the
long run. Indeed, what this result indicate is that our previous surmise of
a mispecification bias in the extreme monetarist identifying scheme is
right. If our scheme is correct the nominal shock estimated under the
monetarist scheme is a composite of «N and «*; even if the contribution
of «* to inflation is small, a powerful long-run positive impact of «* on ut-
put generates the positive impulse response estimated under that
s c h e m e .
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TABLE III.1
SPAIN FORECAST ERROR VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION
Inflation. . . . . . . . . . . . 1 99(3) 0(0) 1(3)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 97(2) 1(0) 2(2)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 87(6) 1(0) 12(6)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 84(7) 1(0) 15(7)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40 77(9) 0(0) 22(9)
Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2(2) 27(6) 71(6)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1(2) 16(4) 82(4)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1(1) 12(3) 87(3)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 1(1) 11(2) 88(3)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40 1(1) 9(2) 90(2)
Unemployment. . . . . . 1 1(3) 47(10) 53(11)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2(2) 18(4) 81(5)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1(1) 5(1) 94(2)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 1(0) 2(1) 97(1)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40 0(0) 0(0) 100(0)
«*«Z«N
Note: Standard errors in brackets. They are calculated using Runkle’s (1987) bootstrap method based
on 1000 replications.
Thus, even for a high unemployment country like Spain, permanent re-
ductions in the inflation rate, achieved through a permanent fall in monetary
growth, might have significant short run unemployment costs, but end up
having net beneficial permanent effects on output(17). Furthermore, the
path following a permanent inflation fall is one of a initial increase in unem-
ployment with a fall or modest increase in output followed by a long run
stronger positive output effect. This path is consistent with the previous re-
sults in the literature: the main costs of disinflation come first, due to nominal
rigidities; when all prices adjust, and the level of unemployment gets back to
its previous level, output increases rapidly to achieve its new long run level.
Additionally, our results show that the way disinflation is pursued matters. In
particular, although the contribution of real factors to inflation is small, perma-
nent reductions in inflation that are achieved through permanent cuts in real
demand, impose upon the economy a permanent cost. What happens in this
case is that the way in which the cut in inflation is obtained also generates
long lasting unemployment effects which outweigh the efficiency gains.
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(17) As an additional check on the robustness of this result we have tried many other
identification schemes, based upon short-run as well as long-run identification restrictions.
According to the results summarised in TableIII.2, a negative long run output effect of im-
pulses to «N is clearly predominant (in 70% of the cases).
TABLE III.2
SENSITIVITY TO ALTERNATIVE IDENTIFICATION SCHEMES
C12(1) = C31(1) = C32(1) = 0 (+) [1] (+) [9] (–) [90] 77 0 22
C13(1) = C31(1) = 0; C31(0) = 0 (+) [0] (–) [73] (+) [27] 75 24 1
C13(1) = C31(1) = 0; C21(0) = 0 (+) [0] (–) [56] (+) [44] 72 27 1
C12(1) = C31(1) = 0; C31(0) = 0 (+) [0] (+) [27] (–) [73] 75 1 24
C12(1) = C31(1) = 0; C12(0) = 0 (+) [1] (+) [8] (–) [91] 78 0 22
C12(1) = C31(1) = 0; C32(0) = 0 (–) [0] (+) [74] (–) [26] 55 2 43
C12(1) = C31(1) = 0; C21(0) = 0 (+) [0] (+) [44] (–) [56] 72 1 27
C12(1) = C32(1) = 0; C31(0) = 0 (+) [5] (+) [9] (–) [86] 67 0 33
C12(1) = C32(1) = 0; C21(0) = 0 (–) [0] (+) [9] (–) [91] 88 0 12
C13(1) = 0; C12(0) = C31(0) = 0 (+) [4] (–) [85] (+) [11] 68 31 0
C13(1) = 0; C21(0) = C31(0) = 0 (+) [0] (–) [64] (+) [36] 77 21 1
C12(1) = 0; C31(0) = C32(0) = 0 (–) [4] (+) [74] (–) [22] 79 3 18
C12(1) = 0; C12(0) = C31(0) = 0 (+) [6] (+) [8] (–) [86] 66 0 34
C12(1) = 0; C21(0) = C31(0) = 0 (+) [0] (+) [36] (–) [64] 77 1 21
C12(1) = 0; C21(0) = C32(0) = 0 (+) [3] (+) [74] (–) [23] 13 3 84
Contribution to the long-run
variance of output (b)
Contribution to the long-run
variance of inflation
«N
Identification scheme (a)
«Z «* «N «Z «*
Notes:
(a) C ij(1) = 0 : long run restriction;
Cij(0) = 0 : short run restriction.
(b) This shows the long run forecast error variance decomposition of output and the sign of the long
run responses of output to the different shocks.
III.4. International Evidence
Most OECD countries have also successfully pursued policies aimed
at lowering the rate of inflation from their peak during the eighties. Al-
though inflation moderation has been less pronounced than in the Span-
ish case, price stability has often been taken as one of the reasons for
fast growth during the mid and late nineties. In this section we analyse
the disinflationary experience of the G7 (United States, Canada, Japan,
Italy, France, United Kingdom, Germany) plus Australia. Since our aim is
to focus in the recent macroeconomic experience the sample period is
1972:2-1996:3(18).
T a b l eIII.3 shows that the overidentified (c3 1(1) = c3 2(1) = c1 2(1) =
c13(1) = 0 in [III.1]) model is largely rejected by the data for all countries.
Again, this might be interpreted as indicating that unemployment and in-
flation are not long-run orthogonal so that the unit root of inflation and un-
employment must have a common component(19). As in the previous
section we introduce such component as a second, non-nominal, source
of inflation so that the identification scheme will not be discussed fur-
ther(20).
The SVAR model under this set of restrictions is estimated for our
sample of eight countries. Figures III.2-III.4 depict the response functions,
for each country, of unemployment, output and inflation to each of the
three shocks. The one year and the long-run forecast error variance de-
compositions are summarised in Tables III.4 and III.5. Although our pri-
mary aim is the identification of the nominal shock, a first glance to Fig-
ures III.2 and III.3 and Tables III.4-III.5 suggests that «* nd «Z look as it
would be expected according to our simple model. In particular, the re-
sponse of all three variables to an innovation in «Z suggests that it can be
interpreted as a productivity or supply shock. A positive productivity
shock has a strong but short-lived effect on unemployment, which might
be caused by a slow process of labour reallocation. This shock hardly
contributes to the forecast variance decomposition of inflation at any time
horizon. Notwithstanding, the contribution of such a supply shock to ex-
plain the unit root of output is slightly low as compared with the contribu-
tion of «*.
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(18) On the grounds of homogeneous data availability, we use data of West Germany
(1972:2-1994:4) instead of Germany, and the sample period is also different for Italy
(1972:2-1995:3).
(19) See, for details on that evidence, King and Watson (1994) for the case of US.
( 2 0 ) In Andrés, Hernando and López-Salido (1998) we summarise the results ob-
tained under non monetarist identification schemes relying upon restrictions on the short run
coefficients, cij(L). Whereas short-run restrictions are less appealing than the long-run ones,
these results confirm those obtained imposing c32(1)=c12(1)=c13(1)=0.
The monetary root of inflation can only be in either «N or in «* , but not
in both since these shocks are, by construction, orthogonal(21). There
are several reasons to argue that the monetary component of inflation has
to be in «N whereas «* is a non-nominal source of permanent inflation.
First, the forecast variance decomposition of the model indicates that «*
explains most of the short and long-run path of unemployment and a great
deal of those of output too, which is not what could be expected from a
nominal shock. Second, in most countries «N might be characterised as a
nominal demand shock. It is demand since the short-run correlation with
unemployment displays a Phillips curve pattern: the increase in inflation
leads to a rapid fall in unemployment in the short run. As inflation reaches
its steady-state level, unemployment returns slowly to its previous level.
On the other hand, «N must be nominal since it accounts for most of the
variance of the forecast error of inflation over the long run, whereas its
contribution to the forecast variance decomposition of output and unem-
ployment is negligible (TablesIII.4 andIII.5). These results are consistent
with the widespread consensus among economists that the long run be-
haviour of real variables is basically driven by real shocks.
As regards the long-run elasticity of output with respect to nominal inno-
vations, it is negative in five out of the eight cases. Actually, a permanent in-
crease in inflation due to a nominal shock has a positive effect on output in
France and Italy and negative in Japan, United States, Australia, United
Kingdom and Canada (although in the later the effect is just weakly signifi-
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TABLE III.3
TEST OF THE OVERIDENTIFYING RESTRICTION
USA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.87 0.000
CANADA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.21 0.000
JAPAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.04 0.000
UNITED KINGDOM . . . . . 20.88 0.000
FRANCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.77 0.029
GERMANY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26.61 0.000
ITALY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34.62 0.000
AUSTRALIA. . . . . . . . . . . . 12.13 0.000
Significance LevelChi-Squared (1 DF)
(21) A common feature of the results obtained is the shape of the response of both in-
flation and output to innovations in the non-nominal source of long-run inflation dynamics
(«*). A negative innovation in «* generates a permanent fall in inflation along with a perma-
nent fall in output, thus explaining why the ex reme monetarist identifying scheme may be
wrong as well as the direction of the bias.
c a n t )(22). This effect is non significant in the case of Germany. Finally, when
the sample period is restricted to 1974:2-1996:3, 1976:3-1996:3 and 1980:1-
1996:3 the negative response of output to innovations in «N be co m e s
stronger and more significant in all cases. This is the main hypothesis we are
interested in: positive «N that rise inflation permanently also have a perma-
nent negative effect on real output. The pattern of response is also consis-
tent with the central banker’s view of disinflations: the main costs come first,
in terms of higher unemployment and lower output, whereas a higher output
is achieved in the medium term. TableIII.6 summarises the discounted pre-
sent value of costs and benefits arising from achieving two percentage points
lower inflation rate, by means of an unanticipated nominal shock(23). Again,
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TABLE III.4
ONE-YEAR FORECAST ERROR VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION
USA Inflation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98(1) 0(0) 2(1)
Output. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4(1) 10(2) 86(3)
Unemployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6(2) 4(1) 90(2)
CANADA Inflation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96(3) 2(1) 2(3)
Output. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1(2) 37(7) 62(7)
Unemployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3(1) 3(1) 94(1)
JAPAN Inflation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71(11) 12(3) 17(13)
Output. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1(1) 30(8) 69(9)
Unemployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5(1) 19(3) 76(4)
UNITED KINGDOM Inflation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78(9) 1(0) 21(9)
Output. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1(1) 36(5) 63(8)
Unemployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9(2) 1(0) 90(2)
FRANCE Inflation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95(3) 3(1) 2(3)
Output. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13(5) 30(7) 57(8)
Unemployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0(0) 14(3) 85(3)
GERMANY Inflation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90(6) 1(0) 9(6)
Output. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8(3) 24(5) 68(7)
Unemployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5(1) 1(0) 94(1)
ITALY Inflation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55(7) 23(5) 22(8)
Output. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34(9) 49(9) 17(9)
Unemployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6(1) 4(1) 91(2)
AUSTRALIA Inflation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97(2) 1(0) 1(2)
Output. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1(1) 24(5) 75(5)
Unemployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1(0) 5(1) 93(1)
«*«N «Z
Note: Standard errors in brackets. They are calculated using Runkle’s (1987) bootstrap method based
on 1000 replications.
(22) When the model includes a time trend, results are very similar, but the negative
effect of nominal shocks in Canada becomes strongly significant.
(23) France and Italy are not included in the Table for reasons that we will discuss be-
low. The short run output cost is calculated using an Okun law with coefficient 2.
these results are consistent with the dynamics of the simple model sketched
in the previous section. If the shock «N is predominantly associated with per-
manent changes in the rate of growth of money, the only way in which it can
exert a permanent effect upon output is through its incidence on the accumu-
lation of productive factors and/or on the level of total factor productivity. This
is precisely what the literature on inflation and growth is about, and our re-
sults confirm that the negative correlation among inflation and output found
in some of these studies cannot be explained solely on the basis of endo-
geneity or reverse causality( 2 4 ) .
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TABLE III.5
LONG-RUN (TEN YEARS) FORECAST ERROR VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION
USA Inflation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86(7) 0(0) 14(7)
Output. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1(1) 16(3) 83(3)
Unemployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1(0) 0(0) 99(0)
CANADA Inflation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84(7) 1(0) 15(7)
Output. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1(1) 68(8) 31(8)
Unemployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0(0) 0(0) 99(0)
JAPAN Inflation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78(6) 2(0) 20(6)
Output. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2(1) 18(7) 80(8)
Unemployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0(0) 1(0) 99(0)
UNITED KINGDOM Inflation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79(8) 0(0) 21(8)
Output. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2(1) 21(5) 77(5)
Unemployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0(0) 0(0) 100(0)
FRANCE Inflation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94(4) 0(0) 5(4)
Output. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9(4) 40(9) 51(9)
Unemployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0(0) 1(0) 99(0)
GERMANY Inflation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77(7) 0(0) 23(7)
Output. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1(0) 9(2) 90(2)
Unemployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0(0) 0(0) 100(0)
ITALY Inflation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62(9) 4(1) 34(10)
Output. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30(10) 67(9) 3(3)
Unemployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1(0) 0(0) 99(0)
AUSTRALIA Inflation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87(7) 0(0) 12(7)
Output. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2(2) 34(7) 64(7)
Unemployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0(0) 0(0) 99(0)
«*«N «Z
Note: Standard errors in brackets. They are calculated using Runkle’s (1987) bootstrap method based
on 1000 replications.
(24) Since output is stationary in first differences in our sample, the effect of inflation is
an effect upon the steady state level of output. This is consistent with the findings in the lit-
erature on growth empirics. See Andrés and Hernando (1999) for a detailed discussion on
this issue.
France and Italy are the only countries in the sample whose be-
haviour is at odds with these negative long-run elasticity results. A closer
inspection of these cases reveals that perhaps the nominal component of
inflation might not be properly identified in these cases. In these two
countries, the estimated short-run responses of unemployment and out-
put to «N do not exhibit the Phillips curve pattern common to all other
countries. Also, whereas the average contribution of «* t  the long-run
forecast error variance of inflation, excluding France and Italy, ranges
from 12 to 22 per cent, this value reaches a low 5 per cent in France and
a high 34 per cent in Italy. This makes the identification of the nominal
shock less reliable than in the rest of the countries. In France the identifi-
cation is not satisfactory since the nominal shock explains a large propor-
tion of the output variance (9 %), far larger than in other countries (ex-
cluding Italy). On the other hand, France is the only country for which in-
flation is almost fully explained by «N with no weight whatsoever for «*; it
is not surprising that the results are close to those obtained under the
overidentified model which incorporates just one source of inflation (i.e.
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TABLE III.6
COSTS AND BENEFITS, AS ANNUALISED % OF GDP, ASSOCIATED WITH
A NOMINAL DISINFLATION OF TWO PERCENTAGE POINTS
SPAIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.23 1.69 1.46
USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.07 0.54 0.47
CANADA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.09 0.84 0.75
JAPAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.02 1.01 0.99
UNITED KINGDOM. . . . . . . . . 0.07 0.92 0.85
FRANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — —
GERMANY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.07 –0.24 –0.31
ITALY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — —
AUSTRALIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.04 0.90 0.86
Net benefitsBenefitsCosts
Note: The discount factor is set to 4%.
(25) The p-value of the overidentifying restrictions is close to the level of non-rejection
(TableIII.3). This scheme, though, has the unpleasant feature that the nominal shock ex-
plains a great proportion of the forecast error variance of output (up to 10 per cent 10 years
ahead).
the extreme monetarist assumption)(25). The identified «N shock also ex-
plains an unreasonably high proportion of long-run output in Italy: 30 per-
cent. Another unpleasant feature of the estimated model for this country
is that inflation is explained almost in similar proportions by «N and «* ,
whereas the later shock explains almost nothing of output in the long run.
III.5. Concluding Remarks
Cross-country regressions aimed at identifying a long run correlation
among inflation and growth have often been blamed for not solving the
crucial issue of causality among these two endogenous variables. An
economy may suffer a rise in inflation for different causes, some of which
may also lead to a fall in output, thus producing a negative correlation
among these variables. A supply shock is an example of this and, since
OECD economies have suffered huge shocks of that kind during the sev-
enties and eighties, it is difficult to give to the results of convergence
equations a structural or causal interpretation. But such an interpretation
is crucial for policy purposes since it tells us whether or not misleading
monetary policies might have significant real costs.
In this chapter we have taken an alternative approach that should be
considered as complementary to the one in chapterII. Instead of looking
for causality from one variable to another, we have analysed that running
from truly exogenous sources of fluctuations towards both inflation and
output. Since a monetary policy component might be one of the shocks
driving both variables, the aim of the exercise has been to identify such
component and test whether it exerts permanent effects on inflation and
output. The results crucially rely on the identification procedure that we
chose to be based on long-run restrictions on the unit root of inflation,
output and unemployment. The model is enlarged with the unemployment
rate to estimate more than one source of inflation, but no role for nominal
shocks on the unit root of unemployment is allowed for.
Our model is capable of explaining why other models that do not al-
low for a second (real) source of inflation (thus mixing all sources in one)
may be misleading. The model has also other appealing features that
make it a reasonable description of the joint dynamics of the three vari-
ables of interest during the sample period: inflation is mostly, although not
exclusively, a monetary phenomenon; nominal shocks have very little in-
fluence on long-run output and unemployment. The results confirm, both
for the Spanish case as well as for most of the other major OECD coun-
tries, that a nominal shock can be indeed identified and that it leads to
opposite long-run movements in inflation and output, thus explaining the
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negative correlation uncovered by the growth equations. Since the nomi-
nal component of the model must be in turn driven by the rate of growth
of the money supply, what the results in this chapter indicate is that there
is indeed a lasting influence of monetary policies beyond the business cy-
cle. Also, the widespread central banker’s view is confirmed: monetary
policies aimed at achieving price stability may have non-negligible short
run costs in terms of rising unemployment and foregone output, but they
do pay-off in the longer term getting the economies onto a path of higher
income.
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APPENDIX III.1. ECONOMETRIC SET-UP
Let us assume that X = {Dp Dy Du} is a covariance stationary vector
that can be represented as a moving average of current and past serially
uncorrelated structural shocks «‘s. In matrix form (in Gali´s (1992) nota-
tion) the structural model can be represented as follows:
Xt = C(L)«t [A III.1]
where C(0) = I. Let us also assume that Xt admits the following reduced
form moving average representation:
Xt = E(L)nt [A III.2]
where the n’s are the innovations in the elements of X, that are correlated
with variance-covariance matrix,
S = Enn’ [A III.3]
The autoregressive representation of the reduced-form is:
B(L) Xt =nt [A III.4]
where B(0)=I, B(L)=E(L)–1. A crucial assumption is that the vector of in-
novations, nt, can be written as linear combination of the vector structural
disturbances «t:
n = S« [A III.5]
which means
C(L) = E(L)S [A III.6]
Under these assumptions, the autoregressive representation of the
structural model is given by,
A(L) Xt =«t [A III.7]
where A(0)=S–1.
The purpose of the exercise is to obtain an estimate of C(L) and «, so
that the dynamics of X in response to structural disturbances can be
traced out. Estimates of B(L), n and the variance-covariance matrix of n
can be obtained by OLS from the reduced-form autoregressive represen-
tation (expression [AIII.4]). Then, E(L) is obtained inverting B(L). To ob-
tain an estimate of S notice that under the assumption of orthogonality of
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the «’s and under the appropriate normalisation, E««’ =I. Thus the follow-
ing relationship holds:
S = Enn’ = E[S««’S’] = SE[««’]S’ = S’S [A III.8]
Since there are 6 different elements on the estimated variance-covari-
ance matrix of n’s we have 6 non linear equations involving the elements
of S of the form:
[A III.9]
Thus, we still need 3 restrictions to estimate the 9 elements on S.
Those elements ought to be obtained imposing additional restrictions in
the model. For that purpose we proceed making use of the relations sug-
gested by economic theory. In particular, we will mainly impose long-run
restrictions —i.e. restrictions upon C(1)—, and, in some cases, we will
combine long and short-run restrictions —i.e restrictions both upon C(1)
and S, respectively—.
SikSkjå
k=1
3
 = s ij
93
94
FIGURE III.1
SPANISH IMPULSE-RESPONSE FUNCTIONS
N o t e s :First row depicts the responses of inflation, output and unemployment to a nominal demand
shock («n); second row depicts the responses of inflation, output and unemployment to a productivity
shock («z); and third row depicts the responses of inflation, output and unemployment to a natural rate
shock («* ) .
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FIGURE III.2.A
RESPONSES TO A NATURAL RATE SHOCK ( «*)
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FIGURE III.2.B
RESPONSES TO A NATURAL RATE SHOCK ( «*)
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FIGURE III.2.C
RESPONSES TO A NATURAL RATE SHOCK ( «*)
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FIGURE III.3.A
RESPONSES TO A PRODUCTIVITY SHOCK («z)
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FIGURE III.3.B
RESPONSES TO A PRODUCTIVITY SHOCK («z)
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FIGURE III.3.C
RESPONSES TO A PRODUCTIVITY SHOCK («z)
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FIGURE III.4.A
RESPONSES TO A NOMINAL DEMAND SHOCK («n)
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FIGURE III.4.B
RESPONSES TO A NOMINAL DEMAND SHOCK («n)
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FIGURE III.4.C
RESPONSES TO A NOMINAL DEMAND SHOCK («n)
CONCLUSIONS
The main finding of this book is that current inflation is not positively
correlated with income per capita over the long run. On the contrary, in-
flation reduces the level of investment as well as the efficiency with which
productive factors are used. It exerts a negative temporary impact upon
long-term growth rates, which, in turn, generates a permanent fall of in-
come per capita. Furthermore, our results suggest that the lower is the in-
flation rate, the higher is the marginal cost of inflation. The estimated ben-
efit of a permanent reduction of inflation by one percentage point de-
pends on the starting level of inflation, ranging from 0.5% to 1 % of out-
put. These benefits are not as large as others reported in the literature,
but are obtained in models displaying a high convergence rate, which
suggests that might be quite sizeable in present value terms.
This negative correlation is first estimated in standard convergence
equations but survives a number of improvements in the econometric
methods. Inflation is still significant in these equations even in presence
of additional regressors, such as the investment rate, population growth
and schooling rates. Also, the negative effect of inflation in growth equa-
tions remains significant after including financial market variables. This
result suggests that the long-run costs of inflation are not merely ex-
plained by policies of financial repression.
Similarly, the estimated correlation cannot be explained on the basis
of the experience of some countries with a particularly poor macroeco-
nomic performance. When high-inflation countries, or episodes, are ex-
cluded from our sample, the negative coefficient of inflation in growth
equation becomes more significant and even higher in absolute value.
What is most remarkable is that such negative coefficient remains signifi-
cant even allowing for country-specific time-invariant effects in the equa-
tions; actually this coefficient is among the few that remain significant in
these specifications. Standard Granger-causality tests give less clear-cut
results, but still causality from inflation to growth is always significant and
never positive in models including country dummies, accumulation rates
as well as other macroeconomic variables.
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Cross-country or panel data models are often criticised on the basis
of reverse causality among these two endogenous variables. Further-
more, inflation and output may be negatively correlated due to the pre-
dominance of adverse supply shocks during the sample period, which
tend to move them in opposite directions. If this were the case, the impli-
cations of the previous econometric results would be of little relevance for
monetary policy. What needs to be ascertained is whether nominal (mon-
etary) shocks that have a permanent effect on the inflation rate also have
a permanent effect on trend output and that these two effects have oppo-
site sign.
To that end we have identified such nominal component of inflation in
a SVAR model, and found that the response of output to an innovation on
that component is indeed negative and significant for several major
OECD economies. Since the nominal component of the model can only
be driven by the rate of growth of the money supply, what we find is that
monetary policies exert a small but significant influence beyond the short-
run, i.e. on the potential output of these economies, thus explaining the
negative correlation uncovered by the growth equations. Although a per-
manent rise in the rate of monetary growth may rise output and reduce
unemployment in the short-run, for reasons familiar to the business cycle
literature, these effects are reversed as time goes by and end up reduc-
ing the product capacity.
All in all, the results of this book, as we read them, confirm that mon-
etary policies aimed at achieving price stability may have non-negligible
short run costs in terms of rising unemployment and foregone output, but
they do pay-off in the longer term getting the economies onto a path of
higher output.
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